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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of priority is fundamental to the prior appropriation
doctrine.' Since Irwin v. Phillips,2 courts in the western states have
used the principle of first-in-time, first-in-right to determine respec-
tive rights of competing appropriators from the same source of water.
Priority provides an objective basis for allocating a limited resource. 3
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Of Counsel, Porzak Browning & Bushong, LLP. I would like to acknowledge val-
uable assistance provided by the following people: Jeffrey Fereday and Michael
Creamer, Givens Pursley, Boise, Idaho; Roger Patterson and Susan France, Ne-
braska Department of Natural Resources; Sandy Fabritz, Arizona Department of
Water Resources; and Jeanine Jones, California Water Agency.
1. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle,
32 ENVTL. L. 37, 42-44 (2002). But see A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule,
Principle, or Rhetoric? 76 N.D. L. REV. 861 (2000).
2. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
3. Most western states utilize special adjudicatory proceedings specifically to deter-
mine the relative priorities of all appropriators of water from the same source.
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Given the typically highly variable supply of water in most western
streams, priority adds a measure of certainty and security to water
uses that would otherwise be lacking. Courts have emphasized the
importance of the priority element of a water right: "The uncertain
nature of the property right in water is evidence that its primary
value is in its relative priority and the right to use the resource and
not in the continuous tangible possession of the resource."4 As
streams reach and exceed full appropriation, priorities become in-
creasingly important for the administration of water uses among com-
peting claimants.
Priority is, however, a purely temporal basis for establishing
rights. It says nothing about the nature of the use, its economic or
social value, its importance in relation to other existing or potential
uses of the water source, or its effects on the ability of subsequent
appropriators to use that source. It rewards the first to use water
with a perpetual right to continue that use to the full extent of the
appropriation, dependent on availability of water. It results in a strict
hierarchy, with senior appropriators motivated to make the fullest
possible use of their appropriation to protect their interests.5
Moreover, the historical function of prior appropriation law-to
make an initial allocation of the West's water resources among poten-
tially competing claimants-has been largely completed. Little unal-
located surface water remains; and the costs of its development, both
financial and environmental, have grown sharply. It is difficult, if not
impossible in many places, to meet new demands for a secure supply
of water by seeking a 2004 appropriation. 6 There is simply no water
available for those at the end of the priority line.
John E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudication: Approaches and Alternatives, 42
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 22-1 (1996).
4. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982); see also Nichols
v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280 (Colo. 1893) ("Property rights in water consist not
alone in the amount of the appropriation, but also in the priority of the appropria-
tion. It often happens that the chief value of an appropriation consists in its pri-
ority over other appropriations from the same natural stream. Hence, to deprive
a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable property right.");
Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891) ("The authorities
seem to concur in the conclusion that the priority to the use of water is a property
right. To limit its transfer, as contended by appellee, would in many instances
destroy much of its value.").
5. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Searchfor Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998); Stephen F. Wil-
liams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Resource
Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7 (1983).
6. Some western streams reached full appropriation long ago. For example, in 1970
the Colorado State Engineer denied permits to develop groundwater underlying
lands located thirteen miles from a surface water resource because the ground-
water feeds the stream and the withdrawal of water would eventually reduce
flows previously appropriated by other water users. Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329
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Thus, those wanting to make a new use requiring water must look
to those already holding water allocations. Most commonly, realloca-
tion occurs by acquiring an existing water right through voluntary
means and going through a change-of-use proceeding to ensure the
new use will not harm existing users.7 Now widely accepted as a
mechanism for meeting new water demands, so-called "water market-
ing" is driving changes not only in the traditional water allocation
structure, but also in the understanding of a water right and the
transferable interest it represents.
Consider the evolution of western water law. The initial impera-
tive in this unsettled region was to encourage individuals to do what
was necessary to put the region's limited surface waters to work while
building an economy. The existing common law principles applying to
water were quickly rejected as unsuited to the task.8 Appropriation,
on the other hand, acknowledged and rewarded the self-initiated ef-
fort of the appropriator. As a rule of capture, it was simple and easily
understood.9 It staked out a definable interest in a limited common
resource, measured by the actual capture and control of some portion
of water-in effect putting boundaries around this water by removing
it from its commons. As mentioned, priority provided an objective
method for sorting out relative rights of competing appropriators to
the same source of water.
(Colo. 1973). Evidence demonstrated a rate of movement of the groundwater of
three-tenths of a mile per year. Thus, groundwater thirteen miles from the
stream would theoretically reach the stream in forty-three years. The Colorado
Supreme Court upheld the denial of the permits by finding the groundwater was
already appropriated by holders of senior surface water rights. Id. at 332. In a
subsequent case, the court held that a conditional right to develop groundwater
could not be decreed in the absence of a plan for augmentation that would offset
any harm to existing appropriators. Bohn v. Kuiper, 575 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1978);
see also Fox v. Div. Engr for Water Div. 5, 810 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991). A few years
later, the court applied this same requirement to a proposed appropriation of sur-
face water in a fully appropriated water source. Lionelle v. Southeastern Colo-
rado Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162 (Colo. 1984).
7. For a good introduction to the change-of-use process, see George A. Gould, Water
Rights Transfers and Third Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1988).
8. Adoption of riparian law not only would have prevented those who were, legally
speaking, trespassers on the public lands from having any legal rights to use
water, but also would have limited uses to lands riparian to the stream. Irwin v.
Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). By the time of the California gold rush, riparian law
in the United States was transforming from "natural flow" into "reasonable use"
in recognition of the growing need to manipulate watercourses to capture the
power of the streamflow to operate mills. See Carol M. Rose, Energy and Effi-
ciency in the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261,
282-88 (1990). Nevertheless, uses of water remained an extension of riparian
landownership.
9. For an exploration of the concept of possession as the basis of property rights, see
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
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Under appropriation principles, one's claim to water is demon-
strated by physical control-measured for surface water most readily
by the size of the headgate and the capacity of the ditch.1o Presuma-
bly a prudent appropriator would not spend the time and money nec-
essary to construct and maintain facilities larger than needed. Yet
apparently it was common for appropriators to do just that, perhaps
because of overestimating the actual usable supply of water or being
overly optimistic about the extent and quality of the lands to be irri-
gated.11 Or perhaps it reflected something in human nature that
wants to have control over something valuable when it is available,
whether or not it is needed.12
10. Applicants for water right decrees typically based their claims to a rate of water
diversion on their own testimony as to the size of their facilities and the number
of acres to be irrigated. With virtually no objective evidence to the contrary,
courts awarded water rights accordingly. ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITU-
TIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE
GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 80 (1903) ("One of the results of
this lack of public investigation of actual conditions has been the granting of ex-
travagant rights to water."). Eventually courts began to question this basis for
quantifying a water right:
The finding as to the capacity of plaintiffs' ditch, and the right originally
acquired thereby to appropriate to the limit of that capacity, is not suffi-
cient as a basis of the judgment. It is neither the capacity of the ditch nor
the amount originally appropriated which determines plaintiffs' rights.
If plaintiffs could forfeit their entire right of appropriation by nonuser,
equally will they be held to forfeit less than the whole by like failure; in
other words, the necessary result of the principles declared on that ap-
peal is that, no matter how great in extent the original quantity may
have been, an appropriator can hold, as against one subsequent in right,
only the maximum quantity of water which he shall have devoted to a
beneficial use at some time within the period by which his right would
otherwise be barred for nonuser. And this principle has been more ex-
plicitly declared in the recent case of Senior v. Anderson, 115 Cal. 496,
47 Pac. 454, where it is held that an appropriation of water by the owner
of land by means of a ditch is not measured by the capacity of the ditch
through which the appropriation is made, but is limited to such quan-
tity, not exceeding the capacity of the ditch, as the appropriator may put
to a useful purpose.
Smith v. Hawkins, 52 P. 139 (Cal. 1898).
11. MEAD, supra note 10, at 148-51.
12. Professor Joseph Sax has analogized attitudes about water in the West to atti-
tudes about gold and other valuable commodities in the feudal ages-hoard what
you get because you never know when such things will be available again. Jo-
seph Sax, Looking Ahead: The Not-so-Dire Future of Western Water Law, Pres-
entation at First Annual Water Law, Policy and Science Conference: Finding
Solutions to Multi-jurisdictional Water Conflicts, Lincoln, Nebraska (Mar. 5,
2004).
An unusually honest statement of such practices is found in Allen v. Petrick,
222 P. 451, 453 (Mont. 1924):
In Montana, as elsewhere, when the early settlers made their origi-
nal appropriations they had little knowledge of the quantity of water
necessary to irrigate their lands to good advantage. Ample quantities of
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In reaction, prior appropriation law added a third element to ap-
propriation and priority-use or, more familiarly, beneficial use. The
addition of use to the doctrine of capture not only reflected the purpose
of making an appropriation, it also provided a means by which to more
carefully define and measure the amount of water required under a
water right.13 In its most common formulation, beneficial use became
"the basis, the measure, and the limit" of the water right.14
water being available in the streams the settlers claimed extravagant
amounts.
... It is a matter of common knowledge in the several judicial dis-
tricts of this state where irrigation has been practiced since the early
days that extravagant quantities of water were awarded the litigants by
the courts. In instances more water was awarded than some of the
ditches of the litigants ever would carry; in others much greater quanti-
ties of water than the litigants ever did or could use beneficially. In
some cases the courts were not to blame. The litigants tried to get all
they could. They even stipulated to the use of quantities of water ridicu-
lously large for the amount of land indicated.
Id.
13. The California Supreme Court explained:
The measure of the right, as to extent, follows the nature of the appropri-
ation, or the uses for which it is taken. The intent to take and appropri-
ate, and the outward act, go together. If we concede that a man has right
by mere priority to take as much water from a running stream as he
chooses, to be applied to such purposes as he pleases, the question still
arises, what did he choose to take? And this depends upon the general
and particular uses he makes of it.
Ortman v. Dixon, 13 Cal. 34, 38-39 (1859).
An appropriator, as against subsequent appropriators, is entitled to the
continued flow to the head of his ditch of the amount of water that he, in
the past, whenever that quantity was present, has diverted for beneficial
purposes, plus a reasonable conveyance loss, subject to the limitation
that the amount be not more than is reasonably necessary, under rea-
sonable methods of diversion, to supply the area of land theretofore
served by his ditch. The appropriator is limited to reasonable beneficial
uses. A reading of the many cases on the law of appropriation indicates
a gradual and consistent tightening of the rule measuring the rights of
appropriators. The early cases measured the appropriator's right by the
capacity of his ditch, but that rule has long since been repudiated in this
state. Smith v. Hawkins, 52 P.139 [(Cal. 1898)]. As the pressure of pop-
ulation has led to the attempt to bring under cultivation more and more
lands, and as the demands for water to irrigate these lands have become
more and more pressing, the decisions have become increasingly em-
phatic in limiting the appropriator to the quantity reasonably necessary
for beneficial uses. Senior v. Anderson, 47 P. 454 [(Cal. 1896)]; Id., 62 P.
563 [(Cal. 1900)]; California P. & A. Co. v. Madera Canal & Irr. Co., 138
P. 718 [(Cal. 1914)]; Northern California Power Co. v. Flood, 199 P. 315
[(Cal. 1921)]; Oliver v. Robnett, 210 P. 408 [(Cal. 1922)]; Pabst v. Fin-
mand, 211 P. 11 [(Cal. 1922)]; Eden Township Water Dist. v. City of Hay-
ward, supra.
Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 997
(Cal. 1935).
14. Reclamation (National Irrigation) Act of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2000).
2004]
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Thus, the legal interest established under prior appropriation law
is a singularly narrow one: it protects a particular use of water as
against interference from others whose uses are established subse-
quent in time.15 The definitional elements of a water right include: (1)
water must be diverted at a specific, identifiable point from a particu-
lar source (a stream, lake, or aquifer), (2) water may be diverted at no
more than a certain rate of flow, (3) water must be used at a specified
location, (4) water must be used for a specified purpose, (5) its use
must be "beneficial," and (6) there must not be an unjustified cessation
of use for some specified period of time. 16 By so circumscribing a prior
appropriation right, individual uses of a public resource (water) are
limited in a manner that allows its benefits to be widely shared.17
Correspondingly, public supervision is required to ensure claims for
use of water are legitimate to fix the legal description, to ensure that
actual use is within the legal authorization, and to resolve disputes.
Under this approach, the purpose of a water right is to enable a
particular water-dependent use to occur. By definition, water is es-
sential to the use. But it is the use that is legally protected, along
with the continued ability to accomplish the use without interference
from other (junior) users of the water.1 8 The most likely source of in-
terference is with the amount of water reasonably necessary to the
use, but it could also take the form of a change in the timing with
which water has been available or in the quality of water available for
use.19 Some would have preferred water rights to remain perma-
15. Appropriators claim "public" water for their own uses. They hold the right to
take temporary possession of particular molecules of water, exclusive of others
who might also want to establish possession of those same molecules of water for
their different purposes. In addition to temporary possession, the appropriator
has the legal right to directly use that water. In the process of use, some portion
of the water is lost through evaporation or transpiration. Human use of water is
said to be usufructuary-that is, to enjoy its benefits without altering its sub-
stance. But, in fact, use also entails some consumption-thereby permanently
removing this portion of water from its source and from use by others.
16. "[W]ater rights have less protection than most other property rights for several
reasons [including] . . . their original definition, limited to beneficial and non-
wasteful uses, imposes limits beyond those that contain most property rights."
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
17. MEAD, supra note 10, at 366; 1 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
STATES 329-30 (3d ed. 1911).
18. Even the owner of the right is clearly secondary to the use:
Water rights are decreed to structures and points of diversion, see Gard-
ner, 200 Colo. at 227, 614 P.2d at 361, in recognition that a water right is
a right of use and constitutes real property in this state, see Green v.
Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 98, 371 P.2d 775, 779 (1962), and the
owners and users of such water rights may change from time to time.
Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 39 (Colo. 1997).
19. For a discussion of the elements of potential interference, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 167-242.
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nently tied to their original use.20 Indeed, most western states have
been ambivalent-at least until relatively recently-about allowing
transfers of water rights to parties intending to change the historical
use of water.2 1
Increasingly, however, water law is moving in the direction of
viewing water rights as giving the holder legal control (if not owner-
ship) of some portion of water. The broad measure of that water is
historical beneficial use, but the measure for transfer purposes usu-
ally is historical consumptive use-that amount of water permanently
removed from the hydrologic system under the right, and therefore
20. This sentiment was especially strong among members of the agricultural commu-
nity concerned that water transfers would result in enlarged uses of water and
that sales of agricultural water rights to cities would weaken the agricultural
economy. They found support with water leaders such as Elwood Mead, who
wrote:
Organized selfishness is more potent than unorganized consideration for
the public interest. The appropriator has been in court in person and by
attorney. The rights of the water-user apart from the ditch-owner have
seldom been considered. Hence it is coming to be, that rights to running
water are ceasing to conform to the requirements of any use, are being
separated from any place of diversion or application, and are being
bought and sold and leased like land or live stock or any other property.
MEAD, supra note 10, at 87. Mead, as Wyoming State Engineer, had taken the
position that a water right is permanently appurtenant to the land on which it is
used. In Johnston v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., 79 P. 22 (Wyo. 1904),
plaintiffs opposing the sale of a water right involving also a change of place of use
used written testimony to this effect from Mead, by then no longer State Engi-
neer. The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged Mead's eminence and ability
but firmly rejected his views:
It is asserted that the doctrine of sale separate from land is the doctrine
of the courts, and not of the irrigators. It is, of course, true that the
public announcement of the doctrine is to be found in the decisions of the
courts; but, had the owners of water rights not conceived that they had a
property in their right to use water which they could convey for use on
other lands, there doubtless would have been no conveyances to be con-
sidered by the courts. We cannot agree that the doctrine has resulted
from ignorance concerning irrigation matters. Nor can we agree with
the notion that men not necessarily or usually trained in the law are
more competent than the courts to determine the legal principles con-
trolling the use of water by prior appropriation, notwithstanding that
the judges may not, as a rule, be practical irrigators.... Legal doctrines
in this country have generally come from the courts, and must, in the
nature of the constitution of our government, continue so to do, except
where, within its province, the Legislature declares what the law shall
be.
Id. at 26. Shortly thereafter, the Wyoming legislature declared: "Water rights
cannot be detached from the lands, place or purpose for which they are acquired,
without loss of priority." Wyo. Laws 1909, ch. 68, § 1 (now codified with some
differences in language at Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (Michie 2003)). See Frank
J. Trelease & Dellas W. Lee, Priority and Progress-Case Studies in the Transfer
of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1966).
21. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 OKLA. L.
REV. 119 (1990).
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unavailable to others. 22 Under this approach, the particular use to
which the water is put is primarily a decision for the holder of the
right to make, subject to the limitation that the use not harm other
water rights. Such a view facilitates voluntary transfer of water
rights to meet new demands for water by clearly acknowledging that
consumptively used water has been commoditized-taken out of the
general supply of water that supports public, non-exclusive benefits
such as navigation, recreation, and fisheries, and potentially perma-
nently committed to that part of the supply serving non-shared, exclu-
sive uses.23 Thus, we are gradually acknowledging that a portion of
our water supply has been de facto privatized. It is this portion we are
making available to the market, at the discretion of the holder of the
water right.
Operating on a separate but parallel (and sometimes intercon-
nected) track are transactions enabling new, out-of-priority water
uses. The notion of an "out-of-priority" water use appears on its face
to be incongruent with the prior appropriation system. Indeed, it does
violate the basic prior appropriation principle that new uses must
stand in line behind all previous uses before they can have access to
the supply of water. For that reason, just as with water transfers, it is
an approach to water allocation that finds its rationale in need more
than in principle. And, just as with water transfers, it depends en-
tirely on the time-honored standard, "do no harm."24
Nevertheless, the traditional belief that new uses should come at
the end of the priority line continues to exercise influence. For exam-
ple, when an enterprising landowner along the Arkansas River in Col-
22. Early recognition of the special status of water consumptively used is found in
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill & S. Mining & Concentrating Co., 49 F.
430 (D. Idaho 1892). The court took note that subsequent appropriators are on
notice when a senior totally uses up water from a source (such as for power by its
conversion into steam) that "its appropriation is such that it cannot be used a
second time. It is a notice that so much water is practically destroyed,-is elimi-
nated from existence as water." Id. at 431-32. "A subsequent locator has actual
notice that this amount of water is withdrawn from all public claim, is absorbed,
and has become a vested right. He cannot base any claim upon it, or upon any
expectation that, some time in the future, it will become the subject of appropria-
tion." Id. at 432.
23. Acknowledgement of the de facto ownership of that portion of water consumed in
the use would substantially facilitate water transfers. MacDonnell, Water as a
Commodity, 3 SOUTHWEST HYDROLOGY 16, 26 (2004).
24. California courts were the first to consider the legal question of whether an ap-
propriator water right could be changed to a different use without loss of priority.
These early decisions allowed such changes, subject to the requirement that no
"injurious consequences" to others result. Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 181 (1860).
For a discussion of these cases, see MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 123-25. For a
discussion of historical bases of this principle, see Daniel R. Coquillete, Mosses
from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases About the En-
vironment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1979).
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orado proposed to remove phreatophytes (primarily tamarisk or salt
cedar) growing along the river, the Colorado Supreme Court denied
his claim for a right to the water historically consumptively used by
the trees.25 The primary objection was to the claimant's request for a
water right without a priority date. The claimant pointed out the
water consumed by the vegetation had not been available to other ap-
propriators, and, but for efforts to eliminate the phreatophytes, water
would continue to be unavailable. As an incentive to remove the vege-
tation, the claimant wanted the ability to use the "salvaged" water.
Characterizing phreatophytes as water thieves stealing water from
existing appropriators, however, the court ruled that any such sal-
vaged water must return to the river.26
The case is interesting also because of its discussion of the concept
of "lack of injury" as a basis for establishing a new water use. Prior
appropriation, of course, limits new uses to unappropriated water.
Thus, in fully appropriated water systems it is not possible to obtain a
new water right. Claimants argued their proposal would enable addi-
tional beneficial uses of water without harming existing appropria-
tors. They suggested their plan responded in a creative manner to the
court's earlier call for "maximum utilization" of Colorado's water with-
out infringing on "vested rights."27
Out-of-priority water uses are grounded on this lack of injury stan-
dard. In concept, such uses are based on ensuring existing, legally-
protected uses can continue unimpaired.28 Of course, the measures
taken must make a new use or an existing out-of-priority use possible
in return. They become important, even necessary, in fully appropri-
ated water systems. Fully realized, they can provide an incentive-
based approach for making more effective use of the water supply.
25. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d
1321 (Colo. 1974).
26. Id. at 1325. There is growing political support for government-funded programs
to remove phreatophytes as a means of reducing this source of water consump-
tion in overextended western rivers. According to one expert, it might cost as
much as $500 million just to remove tamarisk along the Colorado River. Seth
Hettena, To Save Water in the West, Government Looks to Eradicate a Thirsty
Plant, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2003, at Envtl. News Network, available at
http://www.ecology.com/ecology-news-links/2003/articles/6-2003/6-20-03/water.
htm.
27. See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) ("As administration of
water approaches its second century the curtain is opening on the new drama of
maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated
into the law of vested rights. We have known for a long time that the doctrine
was lurking in the backstage shadows as a result of the accepted though often
violated principle that the right to water does not give the right to waste it.").




In Part II, this Article discusses three legal mechanisms poten-
tially enabling out-of-priority water uses: exchanges, substitute sup-
plies of water, and physical solutions. It begins first, in section II.A,
with the most traditional mechanism-the voluntary exchange. As
originally conceived, an exchange is based on an agreement between
holders of two (or more) separate water rights to exchange the use of
water available under the respective rights. Exchanges are products
of physical opportunity in which the parties find advantages in the
swap of water. Examples of such opportunities are presented in this
section, together with a discussion of related law.
In section II.B, the Article looks next at the voluntary exchange's
close relative-the substitute or replacement water supply. In these
transactions, the supply of water upon which other appropriators de-
pend is replaced from another source to allow the new, out-of-priority
use to occur. Because such substitutions can occur without approval
of other water users, they may be regarded as requiring public
supervision.
Next, in section II.C, the Article revisits and redefines a third ap-
proach known as "the physical solution."2 9 As used here, a physical
solution involves making improvements to the manner in which an
existing water use occurs so that another use is made possible. It may
involve making improvements in the existing means of water diver-
sion or in the existing manner of water use. The burden of making (or
paying for) the necessary changes is on the party wanting the new
use. Physical solutions may be based on voluntary agreements or im-
posed by court order.
Finally, in Part III, the Article explores the general legal frame-
work in seven western states governing such actions and, in particu-
lar, the requirements identified to ensure no harm to other water
users. These include issues related to quantity and timing of water,
water quality, and administration. The Article concludes that out-of-
priority water uses can enable more effective use of water resources.
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR OUT-OF-PRIORITY WATER USE
A. Voluntary Exchanges
The term "exchange" is used here to describe transactions in which
water available for use under one water right is exchanged for water
available for use under a different right. We begin with transactions
to which the parties have formally agreed.
Perhaps the earliest form of voluntary exchange to emerge in the
West was the practice of "rotation." Rotation involves the exchange of
29. See Harrison C. Dunning, The 'Physical Solution' in Western Water Law, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 445 (1986).
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water among or between different water rights holders taking their
supply from the same source. In the 1912 edition of his water law
treatise, C.S. Kinney described what he characterized as the "grow-
ing" use of rotation so that each appropriator could take a turn at us-
ing the full quantity of water available in the source to irrigate his or
her lands.30 Rotation is common within a single irrigation system as a
means of sharing water. In addition, irrigators sharing limited
sources of water such as a small creek have sometimes found it more
efficient to take turns making full use of available water.3 1 Indeed,
courts have ordered rotation of water use to resolve disputes between
appropriators. 3 2 Kansas statutorily authorized rotation of water in
1891 and several other states followed thereafter. 33
Just as in cases involving the transfer of a water right to a new
user, courts reviewing exchanges have required some clear evidence
that no other water users will be adversely affected. A legitimate con-
cern was that such loans of water might expand historic use of water
to the detriment of other appropriators. For example, in a 1905 deci-
sion, the Colorado Supreme Court faced a challenge to the State's stat-
30. C.S. KINNEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS §790, at
1379 (2d ed. 1912). As Kinney describes:
These cases arise among appropriators of the waters of a certain stream,
either of the same or of different rank, where they are each entitled to a
certain quantity of the water of a stream all of the time; and, upon cer-
tain occasions, owing to the small amount of water flowing in the
stream, find that if the water is divided according to the exact quantity
to which each is entitled it would be practically worthless to all. Where
this is the case there is no objection in law why they may not agree
among themselves that each shall have the use of all of the water during
certain stated period of time.
Id.
31. WELLS A. HUTCHINS, 1 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
615-16 (1971).
32. See McCoy v. Huntley, 119 P. 481, 482 (Or. 1911). The McCoy court stated:
We see no reason why, even in cases involving prior and subsequent ap-
propriations of water, the courts cannot require the appropriators to al-
ternate in the use of the water. The time when water may be used
recklessly or carelessly has passed in this state. With increasing settle-
ment water has become too scarce and too precious to justify any but an
economical use of it. An appropriator has only the right to use so much
as his needs require and at the time his needs require. And if these are
satisfied by a use of the whole flow every other day, or every alternate
week, he ought not to be heard to complain.
Id. at 375-76, 482; see also Hufford v. Dye, 121 P. 400 (Cal. 1912).
33. The Kansas statute, entitled, "Agreements between proprietors of two or more
works as to rotation of water," is now codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-342 (2000).
Colorado authorized temporary "loans" of water rights in 1899 (now codified at
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-83-105 (West 2003)). Wyoming adopted its statute in
1909 (now codified at Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-612 (Michie 2003)). See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 46-231 (Cum. Supp. 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 533.075 (Reissue
2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 540.150 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.390 (West
2004).
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ute authorizing temporary loans of water.34 The plaintiff, a large
canal company, argued its rights were harmed because junior appro-
priators who had entered into loan arrangements with seniors were
being allowed to take water out of priority. Noting the general rule
that an appropriator without need for water must leave it in the
stream for use by others, the court nevertheless upheld the validity of
the statute by reading into it the requirement that loans not injure
other appropriators and placing the burden of proof on the party as-
serting rights under the loan.3 5
An early Wyoming case involved the permanent transfer of a one-
half interest in a senior water right to another party with a junior
right located downstream, together with an agreement to rotate use of
this water on a weekly basis.36 The intermediate priority user from
the same source, whose headgate was located above that of the other
two users, argued this sale of a water right was illegal under Wyoming
state law. Finding no such restriction in Wyoming law, the court al-
lowed the sale and the change of use of the water to the downstream
lands. Recognizing that such changes of use are limited by the no-
injury rule, the court specifically found the subsequent use of water
had not increased. 37
Informal rotation agreements are at risk, however, when the inter-
ests of those involved change. For example, when the City of Engle-
wood, Colorado purchased ownership of water rights historically used
for irrigation involving an informal rotation practice, it was held that
other irrigators benefiting from the rotation were not injured by the
transfer of the water.38 Moreover, junior appropriators historically
34. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 81 P. 37 (Colo. 1905).
35. Id. at 39-40. In 2004, the Colorado General Assembly significantly amended
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-105 (West 2003). See S.B. 04-032, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004) (Only water rights decreed for agricultural irrigation use
may be loaned. Loans can be for no more than 180 days. The division engineer
must approve the loan, based on a finding of no injury to other decreed water
rights. Loans can be for the purpose of other irrigation use or for instream flow
purposes.).
36. Johnston v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., 79 P. 22 (Wyo. 1904); see discussion
supra note 20.
37. The court stated:
The evidence in this case shows that after the conveyance of the water
right in question the grantor, the Springvale Ditch Company, irrigated
not more than one-half as much land as it had previously irrigated, and
the grantee applied the water which it obtained under the conveyance to
the irrigation of 180 acres of land. This is not an increase over the quan-
tity of land previously irrigated, and there is nothing in the testimony
showing or tending to show that the use of the water since the transfer
has resulted in an injury to the plaintiffs in error.
Johnston, 79 P. at 27.
38. Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116 (Colo. 1951); see also Strole
v. Guymon, 37 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2001). Compare Andreatta v. Andreatta, 537
P.2d 748 (Colo. App. 1975) (purchaser of water right subject to rotation agree-
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benefiting from a rotation arrangement involving a more senior right
are not protected when that senior right is changed to a new use.
39
A practice of voluntary exchanges appears to have arisen in Colo-
rado in the late 1800s to enable more efficient storage of water for
subsequent use.40 Upstream reservoir owners unable to provide
stored water to their own lands worked out agreements with down-
stream irrigators to release water from storage for their benefit in re-
turn for allowing upstream diversions of natural flow to their lands.
In the statutory authority subsequently provided for this practice,
these exchanges were conditioned on the requirement that "the rights
of others are not injured thereby."4 1 Such arrangements operate
under the supervision of the State Engineer and do not require a court
decree. Under a separate source of statutory authority, it has been
common practice for reservoir operators along the South Platte River
in Colorado to store water so that as many reservoirs as possible can
fill, rather than according to the strict priority of their rights.42 Thus,
upstream reservoirs fill first, irrespective of priority, and may be obli-
ment was bound by that agreement) with In re Petition for Organization and
Establishment of an Irrigation Dist. in Ravalli County, to be Known as Daly
Ditches Irrigation Dist., 680 P.2d 944 (Mont. 1984) (involving continuing obliga-
tions to operate an exchange after formation of a new district).
39. In re the Application for Water Rights of Certain Shareholders in the Las Animas
Consol. Canal Co., 688 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1984).
40. Specifically,
[wIhat was necessary was a system of exchanges of water, by which the
upper ditch could throw the water stored in its reservoirs into the lower
ditches and be permitted to take in lieu thereof an equivalent amount of
water from the stream. A system of transfers of this kind has been
worked out. At first it was based only on custom and neighborhood
agreement, but later it was sanctioned by law and is an important con-
tribution to irrigation legislation, not only in Colorado, but as an exam-
ple in other States.
MEAD, supra note 10, at 172; see also HUTCHINS, supra note 31, at 608-10.
41. This statute was originally enacted in 1897. As now codified it reads:
When the rights of others are not injured thereby, it is lawful for the
owner of a reservoir to deliver stored water into a ditch entitled to water
or into the public stream to supply appropriations from said stream and
take in exchange therefor from the public stream higher up an equal
amount of water, less a reasonable deduction for loss, if any there be, to
be determined by the state engineer. The person or company desiring
such exchange shall be required to construct and maintain, under the
direction of the state engineer, measuring flumes or weirs and self-regis-
tering devices at the point where the water is turned into the stream or
ditch taking the same or as near such point as is practicable so that the
division engineer may readily determine and secure the just and equita-
ble exchange of water.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-83-104 (West 2003).
42. Id. § 37-80-120(1). This provision was added to Colorado law in 1969. In the
severe drought of 2002, this voluntary arrangement ceased, and filling occurred
strictly according to priorities. Interview with Hal Simpson, Colo. State Eng'r
(Feb. 17, 2004).
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gated to release water to downstream senior reservoirs if there is not
enough water to fill them.
An Oregon case illustrates the use of storage water in exchange for
direct flow rights.43 The parties had entered into an agreement by
which one could take the other's diversion in one creek in exchange for
water in another creek that would be made available through storage
of water. This exchange was reflected in a subsequent court decree.
The Oregon Supreme Court provided a broad statement of the applica-
ble law:
A subsequent appropriator may assert the right to take the waters of the
stream from which the prior appropriation has been made and give the prior
appropriator in return therefor other water from a different source, but of like
quantity and quality delivered at such a place that the prior appropriator can
make full use thereof without being injured in any way.4 4
In this case, the junior asserted that the senior had given up its
priority as a consequence of the decree. The court rejected this asser-
tion, stating:
While an exchange of waters is permitted, such exchange cannot be given the
effect of changing priority rights to the extent that one holder of an older pri-
ority before such exchange thereafter should be deemed no longer the owner of
a senior priority but only that of a priority junior to the other party to such
exchange. 4 5
A practice of exchanges to obtain higher quality water developed in
the Salt Lake City area of Utah in the early 1900s. 46 Irrigators had
long since fully appropriated water in the streams coming out of the
mountains to the east, leaving only much lower quality water in the
valley to meet growing urban needs.4 7 Salt Lake City worked out
agreements with irrigators to provide water from Utah Lake and the
Jordan River to their canals in exchange for use of the higher quality
water in the streams and, in some cases, to provide drinking water to
their homes from the city's system. To construct facilities necessary to
effectuate one exchange, the city proposed to issue bonds to obtain fi-
nancing. Litigation challenged the city's authority to use municipal
bonds for this purpose, because, it was alleged, exchanges are not ab-
solute water rights.48 The Utah Supreme Court rejected this chal-
43. Dry Gulch Ditch Co. v. Hutton, 133 P.2d 601 (Or. 1943).
44. Id. at 610.
45. Id. at 613.
46. See, e.g., State ex rel. Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 390 P.2d 586
(Utah 1964); Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah 1947); Baird v.
Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 257 P. 1060 (Utah 1927); Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake City,
81 P. 273 (Utah 1905).
47. For discussion of litigation concerned with water quality issues, see infra text
accompanying notes 215-42.
48. Ellerbeck, 81 P. 273. In most cases, an exchange is based on an agreement be-
tween two appropriators but is not itself regarded as a new appropriation of
water. Some exchanges in Colorado have been decreed in court and awarded a
priority date. The advantage is to protect against an appropriation-related
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lenge, finding the exchange agreement to meet the constitutional
requirement of ownership and control. 49
Water users in Arizona utilized exchange agreements as a mecha-
nism for enabling construction of the Salt River Project in the early
1900s. The water of the Salt River had already been fully appropri-
ated at the time the project was approved for construction under the
new Reclamation Act of 1902.50 To enable storage of water in a pro-
posed dam (Roosevelt), it was necessary to work out agreements with
existing water users. One of the mechanisms employed was to con-
struct wells as the source of water for some users and effectively ex-
change the surface water supply for a groundwater supply. These
arrangements were approved in a case filed by the Salt River Valley
Water Users' Association.51
The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act52 placed strict
limitations on the use of groundwater within the Phoenix Active Man-
agement Area in which the Salt River Project operates.5 3 Ground-
water users who had originally held surface water rights objected to
proposed limitations on their use. In 1992, the Arizona legislature es-
tablished a procedure by which existing exchanges could be "enrolled"
with the Department of Water Resources. 54 Enrollment enabled the
Department to account for the groundwater use as if it was in fact
coming from surface water. 55 This legislation also made it possible for
cities to exchange their effluent water for other water.56
change in stream conditions upon which operation of the exchange depends. See
discussion infra note 118. Idaho, Oregon, and Wyoming have a statutory proce-
dure for obtaining a permit to allow operation of an exchange. See infra text
accompanying notes 185-89, 193-96 & 199-201.
49. Ellerbeck, 81 P. at 275.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1902).
51. As construction began, the Association worked out differences among its
members, or shareholders, and clarified their water rights through a
lawsuit, Hurley vs. Abbott. Settled in 1910, the decision became known
as the Kent decree in recognition of the presiding judge, Edward H.
Kent. It is a landmark in water law that still governs water manage-
ment in Arizona today.
Salt River Project website, at http://www.srpnet.com/about/history/water.aspx
(last visited Dec. 15, 2004).
52. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401-637 (West 2003).
53. See id. §§ 45-562(A), 45-563.
54. Id. § 45-1021(A).
55. Personal Communication from Sandy Fabritz, Ariz. Dep't of Water Res. (May 4,
2004).
56. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1002(A)(2) (West 2003). Compare Arizona Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Long, 773 P.2d 988 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that effluent water was neither
surface water nor groundwater and could be sold to others for their use), with
Arizona Mun. Water Users Ass'n v. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 888 P.2d 1323
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the Arizona Ground Water Code authorizes
the Department of Water Resources to count recovered effluent in determining
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Those charged with constructing federal reclamation projects such
as the Salt River Project often found it necessary to work out agree-
ments with existing water users to directly or indirectly exchange
their water rights (usually direct flow rights) for contracts to receive a
water supply from a new project storage facility. In this manner Rec-
lamation improved the reliability of its right to store water from the
source while irrigators received a more secure, season-long supply of
water based on storage. In acknowledgement of the existing rights,
Reclamation typically provided some kind of priority to existing irriga-
tors to the water supply over those coming later.57 Landowners in an
irrigation district that had contracted with Reclamation for an ex-
change of its rights to take water from one source (the Boise River) in
return for supply of water from another source (the Payette and
Salmon Rivers) sought to void the contract.5 8 They argued their indi-
vidual rights to use the water of the Boise had vested and were appur-
tenant to their lands; the district could not exchange their rights
without their permission. Noting the purpose of the exchange was to
obtain an expanded water supply that would benefit the entire dis-
trict, including these landowners, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld
the power of the district to make the agreement. 5 9
Availability of additional water from a Reclamation project may
also make it possible for users receiving this water to exchange their
rights with other senior users. For example, a planned Reclamation
project in Wyoming would bring water from another river into the
lower portion of the Owl Creek drainage.6O In anticipation of this pro-
ject, the Wyoming legislature enacted a statute specifically authoriz-
ing the exchange of water rights in situations "where the source of
municipal compliance with statutory limitations placed on the gallons per capita
per day use of groundwater).
57. For example, in the Yakima Project, water users with appropriations preceding
development of the project hold "non-proratable" water contracts, while users
subsequent to the project hold "proratable" contracts. In times of shortage, only
the proratable users are cut back. See LAWRENCE J. MAcDONNELL, FROM RECLA-
MATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 198 (1999).
There has been extensive litigation questioning whether such priority in fact
exists with respect to the so-called "exchange contractors" in the Central Valley
Project of California. To secure the ability to store the waters of the San Joaquin
River in Friant Dam, Reclamation entered into agreements with parties holding
rights to use the river's water. In exchange for not exercising these rights to use
water from the San Joaquin, the parties obtained a contract providing for deliv-
ery of Sacramento Basin water from the Delta-Mendota Canal. A good summary
is provided in Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (E.D.
Cal. 2001), affd, 337 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003).
58. Bd. of Directors of Wilder Irrigation Dist. v. Jorgensen, 136 P.2d 461 (Idaho
1943).
59. Id. at 466.
60. This example comes from a case study in Trelease & Lee, supra note 20, at 55-57.
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appropriation is at times insufficient to fully satisfy such appropria-
tion, or better conservation and utilization of the state's waters can be
accomplished, or the appropriator can develop appropriable water but
cannot economically convey it to its point of use."6 1 With the authori-
zation, upstream juniors on Owl Creek purchased water from the pro-
ject and then entered into agreements with downstream seniors to
exchange project water for Owl Creek water based on the seniors'
priorities.
In addition to exchanges utilized as part of Reclamation's Central
Valley Project, swaps of water are commonly made in California. Ex-
changes often involve use of groundwater or groundwater storage.
6 2
An example is provided by the water exchange agreements between
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("MWD") and
the Coachella Valley Water District ("District") and the Desert Water
Agency.6 3 MWD provides water from the Colorado River in exchange
for water legally available to the two organizations under contracts
with the State Water Project. 64 Similarly, MWD exchanges water
with the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District under an arrangement
in which MWD provides State Water Projects ("SWP") water to the
District for recharge into the groundwater aquifer or for irrigation use
in years it does not require the SWP water.65 In dry years, the Dis-
trict uses groundwater and allows MWD to use its SWP water.
As these examples illustrate, exchanges can be motivated by a va-
riety of circumstances. A user with an insufficient supply of water in
a fully appropriated system may be able bring water into the system
61. Now codified at Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-106 (Michie 2003).
62. See Jeanine Jones, Groundwater Storage-The Western Experience, 95 J. AM.
WATER WORKS ASS'N 71 (2003). This article describes the practice of "in-lieu"
recharge as "providing a surface water supply to water users who would other-
wise extract groundwater, with the party providing the surface water counting
the unextracted groundwater as its recharge." Id. at 76. It also describes the
example of the Semitropic Water Storage District, located at the south end of the
San Joaquin Valley in Kern County.
63. For a description, see Brian E. Gray, Water Transfers in California: 1981-1989,
in THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING
CHANGING WATER DEMANDS 33 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Principal Investigator,
vol. 2 1990). See also Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water
Transfers: Implications for Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 22
(1995). The Israel and Lund article also discusses operation of the California
Water Bank in 1991 and 1992, in which landowners with surface water and
groundwater rights transferred surface water to the bank and entered into
groundwater substitution contracts. Id. at 9.
64. Water from the Colorado River carried in the California Aqueduct can be diverted
and discharged into the groundwater aquifers used by the two entities. Neither
the Coachella District nor the Desert Water Agency is able to receive SWP water,
because there is no existing delivery mechanism. MWD benefits, because the
quality of SWP water is better than Colorado River water.
65. Gray, supra note 63, at 22.
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but not to her place of use. A user with a delivery right may not be
able to receive the water but can exchange with another who can.
More complete storage of water may be facilitated. A user requiring
high quality water may be able to exchange with users not requiring
that quality. Exchanges enable non-injurious reorganization of water
rights to more effectively accomplish water uses.
B. Involuntary Exchanges or Substitute Water Supplies
Rather than an agreed-upon exchange between two users, a new
user may be able to take water from a source without the agreement of
other users by providing an adequate supply of replacement water.
Such water may come from a totally separate source such as another
river, or it could come from retiring or changing existing uses of water.
The focus is on keeping existing users whole while enabling new uses
of water. This is a more aggressive action, supported on the basis that
parties should be encouraged to find ways to more effectively utilize
available water resources so long as others are not harmed thereby.
Several states have statutes specifically authorizing water uses
premised on adding water to a system from another source. For exam-
ple, Colorado and Idaho statutory provisions specifically authorize one
who adds water from another source to take from the receiving source
an equivalent quantity of water, less evaporation and seepage. 66
Commonly this occurs when water is diverted from one watershed and
brought into another watershed. Idaho law requires state approval of
such exchanges, while Colorado subjects them to supervision by the
State Engineer.67 Oregon law also specifically provides for exchanges
involving replacement water.68
66. The Colorado statute, initially enacted in 1897, provides:
Whenever any person or company diverts water from one public stream
and turns it into another public stream, such person or company may
take out the same amount of water again, less a reasonable deduction for
seepage and evaporation, to be determined by the state engineer.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-101 (West 2003). The Idaho statute provides:
The water that a person is entitled to divert by reason of a valid water
right may be turned into the channel of a natural waterway and mingled
with its water, and then reclaimed, but in reclaiming the water so min-
gled, the amount of water to which prior appropriators may be entitled
shall not be diminished, and due allowance shall be made for loss by
evaporation and seepage.
IDAHO CODE § 42-105(1) (Michie 2003).
67. In Colorado, there would be an appropriation of water from the source with an
intention to beneficially use the water in the receiving watershed. Such an ap-
propriation would go through a water court proceeding to "determine" its priority
and define its use. The role of the State Engineer is to administer the water right
by assuring the appropriator distinguishes the "imported" water from the native
water through appropriate measurement systems.
68. The Oregon statute provides:
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In certain circumstances, an' involuntary exchange may involve
two uses of the same water. In Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water
& Electrical Power Co.,69 the power company proposed to make first
use of water from the Jordan River for hydroelectric power generation
by diverting the water upstream of the city's headgate into a canal on
the opposite side of the river. This resulted in running the water ap-
proximately one mile to its generating plant for use, then carrying the
water via a flume across the river and discharging it into the city's
canal. In a quiet title action, the trial court approved the company's
proposed use of the water. The Utah Supreme Court upheld this deci-
sion, noting the city's right to the water is usufructuary, not proprie-
tary, and that the power company's "secondary" use of the water
would not interfere with the city's actual use. 70 The court explained:
It is simply a case of two uses of the same water under a primary and secon-
dary appropriation, neither one necessarily interfering with the other; and
both uses are beneficial to the public. In such case the prior appropriator can-
not complain simply because of the secondary use, but he has a right to insist
that the water shall be subject to his use and enjoyment to the extent of his
appropriation, and that its quality shall not be impaired so as to defeat the
purpose of its appropriation. 7
1
A more contemporary example occurred in Idaho, involving an ex-
change by which the water supplier for the City of Boise was author-
ized to divert and use, for municipal purposes, a portion of the water
released from upstream federal reservoirs in the Boise River Basin for
salmon recovery purposes in the lower Snake River. 7 2 The use, under
Any person holding a water right established by court decree, a water
right certificate or a water right for which proof of beneficial use has
been approved by the Water Resources Director or Water Resources
Commission or any person applying for or holding a permit issued under
ORS 537.211 for use of water for an in-stream purpose may apply to the
Water Resources Commission for permission to use stored, surface or
ground water from another source in exchange for supplying replace-
ment water in an equal amount to satisfy prior appropriations from the
other source ....
OR. REV. STAT. § 540.533(1) (2003).
69. 67 P. 672 (Utah 1902).
70. Id. at 677.
71. Id. The city also argued that to allow this appropriation would prevent any fu-
ture change of point of diversion such as taking water out of the river further
upstream. The court noted, however, that, under the decree, the ability to make
the secondary use exists only so long as the city continues to divert the water at
its present point of diversion. Id. at 678. The Idaho Supreme Court was less
supportive of a proposal by a party seeking to divert water from an irrigation
company's canal in exchange for captured return flows added back to the system
at another location. Berg v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 213 P. 694 (Idaho 1922). This
"novel" plan was rejected, because it depended solely on use of another's irriga-
tion system. Id. at 695.
72. Application for Exchange of Water, State of Idaho Department of Water Re-
sources, April 27, 1999; In re Application for Exchange of Water in the Name of
United Water Idaho, Preliminary Order, July 22, 1999. To provide water to sup-
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a junior priority right, was made possible by replacing the diversions
with water obtained by retiring an irrigation use of water on the
Snake River.
In a case similar to the voluntary Owl Creek exchange in Wyo-
ming, an irrigation company in Utah purchased water from a federal
reclamation project that it placed in the Spanish Fork River.73 With-
out working out specific agreements with existing users, the company
diverted an equal quantity of water at a point higher on the stream to
supply its needs. Spanish Fork City challenged this action on the ba-
sis that the irrigation company's diversion was not included in an ear-
lier adjudication establishing rights to the use of the river. It was
stipulated there was no agreement providing for the water exchange.
In its defense, the irrigation company pointed to a Utah statute al-
lowing one who appropriates water in one stream and adds it to an-
other stream to take equivalent water from the receiving stream
"above or below" the discharge point so long as the water in the receiv-
ing stream is "not.. . diminished in quantity or deteriorated in qual-
ity."7 4 Pointing out the irrigation company was in effect using water
not available for appropriation when the river was adjudicated, the
Utah Supreme Court dismissed the claim. 75
Courts may not always approve an involuntary exchange over the
objections of an involuntary party, however. In an Idaho case, the
plaintiff sought to require another appropriator to take water brought
from the Lemhi River into Agency Creek in exchange for enabling the
plaintiff to divert water from Agency Creek upstream. 76 Noting the
water delivered from Lemhi River was not adjudicated while the ex-
changee's right on Agency Creek was, the court ruled that state en-
port downstream migration of salmon and steelhead in the lower Snake River
during the summer months, the Bureau of Reclamation releases uncontracted-for
water from its reservoirs on the upper Snake and Boise Rivers. United Water
Idaho purchased a licensed irrigation water right with a 1964 priority to divert
eleven cubic feet per second of water from the Snake River at a point upstream of
the Boise River's confluence with the Snake. Under the exchange, United Water
forgoes diversion of this Snake River water in exchange for the ability to divert
eleven cubic feet per second from the Boise River under a 1993 priority. The
Snake River water then replaces United Water's Boise River depletions at and
below the mouth of the Boise River. The exchange is conditioned to occur only
during such times as the Bureau of Reclamation is releasing water from the Boise
River reservoirs for salmon recovery.
73. Spanish Fork City v. Spanish Fork East Bench Irrigation and Mining Co., 151 P.
46 (Utah 1915).
74. Id. at 47.
75. The court acknowledged the uncertainties of allowing such unsupervised ar-
rangements but determined that the statute did not require permission. Id.
Shortly thereafter, Utah added such a requirement to its law. See discussion in-
fra accompanying note 197.
76. Daniels v. Adair, 220 P. 107 (Idaho 1923).
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forcement requiring the exchange would constitute an unconstitu-
tional taking of the appropriator's right.77
The idea of providing replacement water to resolve disputes be-
tween competing claimants for the same water emerged early in Cali-
fornia. In Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara,78 the
court suggested the city replace surface water it was in effect taking
from the water company because of development of underground
water:
It is disclosed that of all the waters which the tunnel takes but 4.16 inches are
from the flow of the stream. If that amount of water could be made good to the
plaintiff, the judgment in common equity should provide accordingly. It would
be a manifest hardship and injustice to deprive the defendant by injunction of
the right to take any of the water when only a small part of that which it does
take is subject to the claim of plaintiff, and plaintiff could be fully compen-
sated by a restoration of it.
7 9
In a later case involving construction of a reservoir that would reduce
streamflows historically recharging the groundwater supply relied on
by a senior appropriator, the California Supreme Court placed the
burden on the subsequent appropriator to assure the long-term availa-
bility of water to the senior.8 0 These decisions are in a series of cases
in which California courts have encouraged or ordered parties to im-
plement a "physical solution" to their dispute.S1
Offsetting injury through provision of replacement water has also
emerged as an option in disputes between competing groundwater ap-
propriators. When groundwater rights are based on prior appropria-
tion principles, impairment of a senior appropriator's withdrawals
may be viewed in some states as an impermissible infringement of se-
nior rights.82 The senior appropriator is regarded as entitled to con-
tinue to receive the same quantity of water as before pumping by the
junior began. This requirement either may act as an absolute limita-
tion on the junior or may be regarded as imposing a responsibility on
the junior to find some way to keep the senior whole.
A decision by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1915 suggested replace-
ment of a senior's water withdrawals diminished by pumping from a
junior well located in an artesian aquifer:
If the construction of appellants' well, as found by the court, has opened up a
direct channel of communication with the same artesian belt or basin tapped
by the Bower wells located in the tank, from which the same are supplied with
water, the court would not be justified in issuing a perpetual injunction en-
joining appellants from sinking their well unless it was further conclusively
77. Id. at 108.
78. 77 P. 1113 (Cal. 1904).
79. Id. at 1118.
80. City of Lodi v. Easy Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 452 (Cal. 1936).
81. Dunning, supra note 29, at 458.
82. For a summary of the law related to protecting pumping levels, see A. DAN
TARLOCK, LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 6.11 (1988).
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established that by reason of the appellants' well coming in contact with the
channel or artesian belt or basin, which supplied water to the Bower wells, it
resulted in the permanent loss of water in the Bower wells, which water could
not be replaced from the well of the appellants without permanent injury to
respondents. The fact that the further sinking of appellants' well would en-
danger the supply of water to respondents' well is not, in and of itself, suffi-
cient to support the judgment. It must further appear that the sinking of
appellants' well did not only endanger the loss of water in respondents' well,
but that said loss would be actual and permanent, and the water so lost could
not be returned to respondents' irrigating system from the well of appellants.
Should the flow of water in respondents' well be lessened by reason of the
sinking of appellants' well, or should the inability of appellants to return to
the irrigating system of respondents any loss in the water supply from the
wells of respondents be established, the damages thus sustained could be
speedily remedied by an order of the court directing that the well of appellants
be permanently plugged or closed.
8 3
A later example of using this remedy is provided in Wayman v.
Murray City Corporation.8 4 In this case the city had deepened an ex-
isting well to improve production with the effect of reducing withdraw-
als from some nearby wells. The district court had ordered the city to
permanently replace water to the affected users "in amount and qual-
ity equal to the level of their prior use."85 The Utah Supreme Court
upheld the requirement to provide replacement water, but limited it to
existing conditions in the aquifer and made the requirement subject to
change if there was a substantial change in these conditions.8 6
New Mexico adopted the strategy of allowing a new groundwater
appropriator to take water destined for use by senior surface water
83. Bower v. Moorman, 147 P. 496, 503 (Idaho 1915).
84. 458 P.2d 861 (Utah 1969).
85. Id. at 864.
86. The court explained:
This imposes upon Murray City a sweeping and pervasive responsibility.
It seems tantamount to requiring it to insure to the plaintiffs a continu-
ous supply of 100% of their allotted flow henceforward, i.e., we assume,
forever. Some questions arise in one's mind. In view of the lack of exact
knowledge concerning numerous factors involved in underground water
basins, including unpredictable variations in future conditions, such as
the annual precipitation and recharge of the basin, the movement of wa-
ters in aquifers, the drainage, both above and below ground, and unfore-
seeable changes in any of the foregoing, how could anyone presage with
accuracy that the plaintiffs' wells would have had a 100% continuum of
their allotted flow 'permanently'? From what we have been able to learn
about underground water it seems obvious that any decree so 'set in con-
crete could prove to be highly inequitable and inconsistent with the
objectives of our water law as set forth herein. In order to harmonize
with those objectives and to have a realistic application to the rights to
the use of water any such decree should be understood as relating to the
then existing conditions as shown by the evidence in the particular case,
and also should be understood as being subject to change if it is shown
that there is any substantial change in such conditions.
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users through replacement of depletions.87 The City of Albuquerque
applied for permits to withdraw groundwater from an aquifer closely
connected to the Rio Grande. Finding such withdrawals would impair
the rights of senior surface water users, the State Engineer proposed
that the city retire existing surface rights to offset the impairment. In
an action brought by the city challenging this decision, the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court upheld the proposed condition. The court noted
findings that about one half of the water to be pumped would, over a
seventy-five year period, come from the river (assuming forty percent
would return to the river after treatment).8 8 Since the Rio Grande
was fully appropriated, groundwater pumping could only occur if this
portion was replaced. In a 1980 statute directed at water problems
associated with mine dewatering, the New Mexico legislature author-
ized a "right of replacement" when a new appropriation "would other-
wise impair existing water rights."8 9
Perhaps the most prominent example of this approach emerged in
Colorado in the 1960s to enable existing junior users of "tributary"
groundwater-water so closely linked to adjacent surface water that
its withdrawal and use can draw water away from the surface
source-to continue pumping out of priority.90 Rights to use tributary
groundwater in Colorado are regulated under the same statutes gov-
erning uses of surface water. In theory, withdrawals of such ground-
water were to be administered under the same priority system
applying to surface water rights. In practice, few wells had gone
through the procedures required to establish their priority and the ex-
tent and nature of their use. As the numbers of these wells increased,
the effects of their withdrawals on surface water availability became
increasingly evident. Senior surface water users complained they
were being curtailed in times of water shortage while much more jun-
ior wells continued to pump.9 1
In 1969, as part of a major revision to its water laws, the Colorado
General Assembly adopted several provisions intended to integrate
groundwater pumping with surface water diversions. Of special inter-
est here, it introduced a new kind of water right, called a plan for
87. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (N.M. 1962).
88. Id. at 81.
89. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12A-4 (Michie 1997). Application must be made to the
State Engineer for a plan of replacement.
90. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see Harrison & Sandstrom, The
Groundwater-Surface Water Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1971); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Colorado's Law of "Under-
ground Water": A Look at the South Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U. OF COLO. L.
REV. 579 (1988); Steven 0. Sims & Veronica A. Sperling, Groundwater Issues:
Has the Act Really Integrated Ground Water with Surface Water, Retrospective
of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, CLE in Den-
ver, Colorado (Oct. 8, 2003).
91. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
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augmentation-defined as "a detailed program... to increase the sup-
ply of water available for beneficial use."9 2 Specific means authorized
to accomplish this objective included "the development of new or alter-
nate means or points of diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by
water exchange projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by
the development of new sources of water, or by any other appropriate
means."9 3 The General Assembly required court approval of augmen-
tation plans, subject to a finding that the plan will not injuriously af-
fect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under vested water
rights. 94
In return for supplying an alternative source of water under a
plan, the supplier is entitled to take an equivalent quantity of water.
So long as the substituted water is "of a quality and quantity so as to
meet the requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator
has normally been used," the senior must accept the substitute
supply.9 5
It was expected that groundwater pumpers would apply in court
for a decree "determining" their rights and simultaneously, through a
plan for augmentation, obtain approval for their out-of-priority with-
drawals by providing sufficient water to senior surface water uses to
replace depletions associated with their pumping.9 6 Such expecta-
tions turned out to be optimistic, however. To get an approved plan
for augmentation, well owners had to first determine the extent of
stream depletions associated with their pumping and second, obtain a
permanent source of replacement water they could add to the stream
to offset their depletions. 9 7
During this period some enterprising parties realized there was
nothing about the plan for augmentation concept that restricted its
use to integration of existing wells with senior surface rights. More
92. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-103(9) (West 2003).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 37-92-305(3).
95. Id. § 37-92-305(5).
96. Well owners were given a three-year period during which they could apply for a
decree with the ability to obtain a priority based on the year pumping began.
Ordinarily, under the Colorado postponement doctrine an appropriator's priority
depends on the year in which a decree is obtained. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-
92-306 (West 2003).
97. Apparently, the original plan was for the State to help develop or acquire this
replacement water, but that plan was never implemented. Hal Simpson, What is
Working for Water Administration Officials and What is Not, Retrospective of the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, CLE in Denver, Col-
orado (Oct. 8, 2003). Plans may now be approved by a water court without per-
manent commitment of a replacement source of water. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-92-305(8). However, approval must contain conditions to assure no injury to
other appropriators-generally, curtailment of the out-of-priority use in the
event replacement water is not available. Provision must be made for replace-
ment of depletions that continue to occur after the well-pumping has ceased.
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broadly, the purpose of a plan for augmentation is to enable new (out-
of-priority) water uses so long as they can occur without injury to ex-
isting water uses. Thus, developers sought approval for use of tribu-
tary groundwater under a plan for augmentation. The plan
specifically identified net depletions (accounting for added return
flows) to the stream that would be associated with the withdrawal and
use of the groundwater and provided replacement water from reser-
voir storage and through retirement of direct flow rights. Two such
plans reached the Colorado Supreme Court in 1976, and both were
found valid under the standard that "water is available for appropria-
tion when the diversion thereof does not injure holders of vested water
rights."98
For many years following the 1969 act, most preexisting wells in
the South Platte and Arkansas basins operated under informal "sub-
stitute supply plans" supervised by the Colorado State Engineer.99
Well owners banded together in associations and used a variety of
means to provide water to senior surface users as needed to offset the
effects of their depletions. In general, the approach was to get enough
water to the seniors to keep the "call" off the river as long as possi-
ble.1 00 Legal authority for this approach had been found in a provi-
sion of Colorado law also enacted in 1969:
Individuals and private or public entities, alone or in concert... [must] pro-
vide a substituted supply of water to one or more appropriators senior to
them, not to exceed that to which any senior appropriator is entitled from time
to time by virtue of his appropriations, and, to the extent that such substi-
tuted water is made available to meet the appropriative requirements of such
senior [appropriator], the right of such senior to draw water pursuant to his
appropriation shall be deemed to [have been] satisfied. 1 0 1
Under this provision, the State Engineer required the well associa-
tions to file a "substitute supply plan" each year providing information
about expected groundwater withdrawals and effects on the stream
and identifying sources of replacement water to offset calls. In a case
98. Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 294
(Colo. 1976). The companion case to Cache LaPoudre is Kelly Ranch v. South-
eastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1976). See dis-
cussion of injury analysis in text accompanying notes 204-11, infra.
99. MacDonnell, supra note 90, at 592-96.
100. A senior appropriator not receiving water to which she is entitled under her ap-
propriation may demand all appropriators of water from the same source to cur-
tail their diversions so water will reach the senior's headgate. The call is
administered by the division engineer who informs junior appropriators to cease
their diversions. In overappropriated rivers such as the South Platte and the
Arkansas, this situation occurs every year during the irrigation season-earlier
in drier years. Arrangements made to get water to such seniors included install-
ing wells adjacent to their ditch to provide water, releases of water from reser-
voirs, recharge of surplus surface water during high flow or winter times, and
leases of unconsumed imported or foreign water.
101. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-80-120(2) (West 2003).
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not involving well-pumping, however, the Colorado Supreme Court
held this provision did not authorize out-of-priority water uses.1 02
As a consequence, all wells in the South Platte Basin causing out-
of-priority depletions to surface water resources are required to obtain
a court-approved plan for augmentation.1 0 3 As a transition mecha-
nism, the General Assembly provided for temporary use of substitute
water supply plans approved by the State Engineer.1O4 Approval is
based on determination that operation of the plan "will replace all out-
of-priority stream depletions in time, location, and amount in a man-
ner that will prevent injury to other water rights and decreed condi-
tional water rights, including water quality and continuity to meet the
requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has normally
been put."1o5
In addition to tributary groundwater, another source of water used
as replacement of out-of-priority water uses in Colorado is "imported"
or "foreign" water-water added to a stream system from an uncon-
nected stream system.' 0 6 Colorado law specifically authorizes the im-
porter to "make a succession of uses of such water by exchange or
otherwise to the extent that its volume can be distinguished from the
volume of the streams into which it is introduced."' 0 7 It has become
common practice for importers to take additional "native" water from
a stream system in exchange for water added to the system but not
consumed. 0 8 This practice was upheld in a case involving City of
102. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. 2001). The court
decided this provision applied only to exchanges involving storage water for res-
ervoirs. The transaction in this case was an out-of-priority diversion that had
been loosely supervised under a State Engineer-approved substitute supply plan.
The court held only court-approved plans for augmentation can authorize out-of-
priority diversions.
103. The Colorado legislature has specially authorized the use of substitute supply
plans for wells in the Arkansas River Basin. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-
308(3) (West 2003).
104. Id. § 37-92-308.
105. Id. § 37-92-308(3)(b)(IV).
106. See, e.g., In re the Application for Water Rights of Midway Ranches Property
Owners' Ass'n Inc. in El Paso and Pueblo Counties, 938 P.2d 515, 522 (Colo. 1997)
("Replacement water may be provided from any water source legally available for
use in an augmentation plan, including: (1) non-tributary water; (2) developed
water which is foreign to the tributary system; and (3) tributary native water
which has been quantified by historic beneficial use.").
107. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-82-106(1) (West 2003). See also City of Denver v.
Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (Colo 1972).
108. See generally David C. Hallford, Water Reuse and Exchange Plans, 17 COLO. LAW.
1083 (1988); Casey S. Funk & Amy M. Cavanaugh, Basic Exchange 101, 1 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 206 (1997). The 1897 statute authorizing reservoir owners
to exchange stored water with water from the stream requires only State Engi-
neer supervision to ensure a "just and equitable exchange." CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37-83-104 (West 2003). Another statute providing for substitution or ex-
change of water authorizes their treatment as separate appropriations that may
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Pueblo exchanges of treated effluent from its transmountain diver-
sions with native Arkansas River water for storage in its upstream
reservoir.109
Still another potential source of water for exchange in Colorado is
what is called "nontributary" groundwater-water in aquifers effec-
tively segregated from surface water sources. 110 The addition of such
water to a stream system is treated as analogous to imported water,
and the party introducing the water to the stream has the right of
reuse or exchange."'l Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the
right of the Willows Water District to use credits from return flows of
nontributary water as replacement water to offset depletions from
proposed pumping from tributary wells.11 2
Colorado also has allowed gravel mining operations occurring in
the alluvium adjacent to a stream to create permanent ponds of water,
so long as the evaporation associated with exposing water to the sur-
face is fully replaced. 1 ' 3 The issue arose in the context of a gravel
mining operation in a fully appropriated stream system operating
be adjudicated. Id. § 37-80-120(4); see also id. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (directing the fil-
ing of an application with the water clerk for "approval of a proposed or existing
exchange of water under section 37-80-120 or 37-83-104"). These authorizations
are extensively used by entities such as Denver Water that import substantial
amounts of transmountain water to maximize use of their reservoirs through in-
voluntary exchanges.
109. City of Florence v. Bd. of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990). The process of
tracking exchanges increasingly involves detailed accounting systems. As de-
scribed in this decision, the Pueblo Board of Waterworks uses accounting systems
to track the ratio of native to transmountain water used, infiltration of ground-
water, and transit losses. Id. at 150 n.5. It uses different types of exchanges.
One, called a "river flow exchange," involves upstream diversions into storage of
native water in exchange for releases of transmountain effluent at its treatment
facilities. Another, called a "contract exchange," operates under agreement with
owners of storage water to release this water for Pueblo's use in exchange for
transmountain effluent from its treatment facilities. Id. n.6. Water quality is-
sues presented in this case are discussed infra in the text accompanying note 232.
110. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-103(10.5) (West 2003). More specifically, non-
tributary groundwater is defined as water "the withdrawal of which will not,
within one hundred years, deplete the flow of a natural stream.... at an annual
rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal." Id.
111. Id. § 37-82-106(2).
112. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1993).
113. The statute provides:
No person shall, in connection with the extraction of sand and gravel by
open mining..., expose designated ground water to the atmosphere un-
less said person has obtained a well permit from the ground water com-
mission. If an application for such a well permit cannot otherwise be
granted pursuant to this section, a well permit shall be issued upon ap-
proval by the ground water commission of a replacement plan which
meets the requirements of this article, pursuant to the guidelines or
rules and regulations adopted by the commission.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-107(6)(a)(I) (West 2003) (within a designated
groundwater basin). Another section of import provides:
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under a permit from the state Mined Land Reclamation Board.1 14
The plan for reclamation was to create a series of lakes in the gravel
pits for recreational and fishing purposes. Water users argued the ef-
fect of creating these lakes was to appropriate groundwater, thus re-
quiring a permit from the State Engineer. The Colorado Supreme
Court agreed. The General Assembly then provided statutory means
by which such water uses would be allowed. 11 5
As mentioned, Colorado distinguishes exchanges from out-of-prior-
ity water use. Exchanges may operate under State Engineer supervi-
sion without a requirement of a court decree, while out-of-priority uses
require a court-approved plan for augmentation. The Colorado Su-
preme Court has described an exchange as "a water management
practice the State Engineer administers between decreed points of di-
version."116 According to the court,
[flour critical elements of an exchange are that: (1) the source of substitute
supply must be above the calling water right; (2) the substitute supply must
be equivalent in amount and of suitable quality to the downstream senior ap-
propriator; (3) there must be available natural flow at the point of the up-
stream diversion; and (4) the rights of others cannot be injured when
implementing the exchange. 1 1 7
Exchanges may be submitted to the water court for approval. By
so doing, the applicant obtains a priority date for the exchange. The
significance of the priority date is its ability to protect the applicant's
right to utilize the "exchange capacity" of the stream-that is, the
availability of sufficient water in the stream between the point of di-
version of the new use and the point of diversion of the exchanged
right. Often it is the exchange capacity of the intervening stream that
limits the ability to make an exchange.118
No person shall, in connection with the extraction of sand and gravel by
open mining .... expose ground water to the atmosphere unless said
person has obtained a well permit from the state engineer pursuant to
this section. A well permit shall be issued upon approval by the water
court of a plan for augmentation or upon approval by the state engineer
of a plan of substitute supply ....
Id. § 37-90-137(11)(a)(I) (outside of a designated groundwater basin).
114. Zigan Sand & Gravel v. Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d 175 (Colo.
1988); Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d
164 (Colo. 1988).
115. See supra note 113.
116. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1155 (Colo. 2001).
117. Id.
118. For example, there may be diversions of water between the new upstream use
and the downstream point where additional water is added to the stream. The
intervening diversions must not be impaired by the new use, a requirement that
is met so long as there is sufficient water in the stream for all intervening
diverters despite the new use. A decreed exchange protects these existing stream
conditions from changes resulting from new appropriations of water or changes of
water rights subsequent to the decree.
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An augmentation plan, under Colorado law, allows a diversion
outside of the priority system. It does this by replacement of deple-
tions associated with the new use. The primary use of augmentation
plans to date has been to enable withdrawals of tributary ground-
water in an otherwise fully appropriated system by replacing any as-
sociated depletions of water to the stream. Augmentation plans also
are used to enable new uses of surface water that would be out of pri-
ority in which the use is not directly a change of use of an existing
right. Augmentation plans require court review and approval.
An ongoing situation in Idaho illustrates the kinds of problems
driving the search for solutions that enable out-of-priority water uses
to occur. Along the Snake River below Milner Dam, there is an area
known as Thousand Springs, where groundwater from the Eastern
Snake Plain Aquifer emerges as springs along the cliffsides. 119 A con-
siderable aquaculture industry has developed along this reach since
the 1950s, taking advantage of the high-quality, ideal-temperature
water for raising fish. Declines in discharges from the springs
prompted the director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources to
threaten curtailment of pumping from junior wells drawing water
from the aquifer.
Analysis of the causes of the declining discharges revealed a com-
plicated story reflective of the ways human uses of water have altered
preexisting hydrology. More than 100 years of irrigation of lands
overlying the aquifer with water from the Snake River substantially
increased the amount of water contained in this geologically complex
structure, increasing the rate of recorded discharges from the springs
between 1900 and 1950. Just at the time the aquaculture industry
began establishing its rights to the water from the springs, discharges
began declining. Two primary factors appear to explain the decline:
changing patterns of surface water use and increased groundwater
development.120
With the active involvement of the governor's office and the legisla-
ture, the water users have developed an agreement, by which the
groundwater users will provide replacement water, will convert some
groundwater uses to surface water uses, and will help the aquaculture
users make some physical improvements, among other things, to off-
119. Background information is taken from the Preliminary Mitigation Plan of North
Snake Ground Water District and Magic Valley Ground Water District, Submit-
ted to the Idaho Department of Water Resources at 11 (Oct. 9, 2003).
120. The quantities of water diverted from the Snake River for use on lands overlying
the aquifer declined, both because of foregoing wintertime diversions primarily
for domestic use and because of improved efficiencies of water use. Thus the 'in-
cidental recharge" associated with these uses no longer occurred. Id. at 11. In
recent years, drought has become another factor in declining aquifer water levels.
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set the effects of their pumping.12 1 Proposed "Water Management
Rules" for integrating junior water rights with senior water rights in-
clude, in addition to curtailment of the junior right, the option of miti-
gation to avoid injury to seniors.122 Thus, Idaho appears to be moving
in the direction of allowing out-of-priority uses that can occur compati-
bly with other rights.
Interest in using replacement water to enable a new out-of-priority
use depends on whether adequate replacement water is available and
whether the new use is valuable enough to warrant the expense of
providing that water. On its face, it may seem that there is no net
gain, since existing uses must be fully protected. In practice, there
appear to be opportunities in certain circumstances in which there can
be significant benefits to the new user without any diminishment of
benefits to existing users. In many cases, retirement or transfer of
existing water uses provide the necessary replacement water.
C. Physical Solutions
Professor Dunning explains the basis of the physical solution in the
following manner: "The possibility of a physical solution arises when a
senior is protected as to a water entitlement or as to a means of diver-
sion, system of distribution or pattern of use of water, but this protec-
tion seems to preclude or inhibit a desirable use by a junior."123
Consideration of possible physical solutions to disputes between users
of water from the same source emerged in California court decisions
beginning in the early 1900s. This resolution option is now a well-
established principle of California law.124
The option of providing a replacement water supply suggested in
some physical solution cases has already been discussed. 125 This sec-
tion limits application of the physical solution concept to physical solu-
tions-that is, those making some physical change in the senior's use
to allow the junior use to occur.
Physical improvements to existing methods of diversion may pro-
vide a means of enabling additional water uses. For example, full de-
velopment of groundwater aquifers can be limited if legal protection is
given to maintain water levels relied on by existing wells.126 A physi-
121. The Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer Mitigation Recovery and Restoration Agree-
ment for 2004, March 20, 2004.
122. Working Draft Text for Negotiated Rulemaking by the Idaho Department of
Water Resources, IDAPA Docket No. 37-0313-9701 (July 10, 2001).
123. Dunning, supra note 29, at 458.
124. A. LITTLEWORTH & E. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 186-90 (1995); 1 ROGERS &
NICHOLS, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA § 404 (1967).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 78-122.
126. Most states do not absolutely protect existing groundwater levels but allow some
reasonable variation or reduction in levels to accommodate new uses and changes
in recharge rates. Many states allow mining of the groundwater in the case of
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cal solution to such a situation is to have a new user pay the costs of
deepening existing wells. Thus, in a 1933 Idaho case, the court im-
posed a duty on a new user to pay for deepening the senior's well to
ensure the continued ability to pump the same quantity of water.127
In a subsequent Utah case, the court embraced this view in the follow-
ing manner:
Prior appropriators of this underground water who have beneficially used it
through the natural flow of springs or artesian wells are entitled to have the
subsequent appropriators restrained from drawing the water out of and lower-
ing the static head pressure of this underground basin unless they replace the
quantity and quality of the water by pumping or other means to the prior
appropriators at the sole cost of the subsequent appropriators. The same rule
should apply to all junior appropriators present and future. 1 2 8
A 1978 Nebraska case involved interference with artesian pres-
sure, enjoyed by small domestic wells, caused by pumping from a sub-
sequent large irrigation well drawing water from the same aquifer.129
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld an award of damages assessed
non-rechargeable aquifers. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-137(4)(b)(I)
(West 2003) ("Permits issued pursuant to this subsection (4) shall allow with-
drawals on the basis of an aquifer life of one hundred years."). See also Mathers
v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771 (N.M. 1966) (involving a state designated ground-
water basin in which withdrawals were based on reaching the maximum eco-
nomic pumping levels in forty years). The legal question is who bears the cost of
deepening existing wells as groundwater levels decline. The Utah response was
to impose the cost on the one wanting to withdraw additional water (junior pays
rule). See infra note 123 and accompanying text. The Colorado response was to
ask whether it was within the "economic reach" of the existing user to deepen the
well. Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1961). If so, the user must
deepen her own well to achieve a reasonably efficient means of diversion. Id. at
556. By statute, several western states have developed a version of the economic
reach rule, based on the value of the use to which the groundwater is placed. See,
e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 534.10 (Reissue 2003) (under which groundwater permits
are given, conditioned on the "reasonable lowering of the static water level at the
appropriator's point of diversion"). The State Engineer is charged with determin-
ing what is reasonable in a given area based on the economics of pumping water
for the general type of crops growing in the area. Oregon law defines "economic"
pumping levels as "the level below land surface at which the per-acre cost of
pumping equals 70 percent of the net increase in annual per-acre value derived
by irrigating. . . ." OR. ADMIN. R. 690-008-0001(5) (2004).
127. Noh v. Stoner, 26 P.2d 1112 (Idaho 1933). The junior pumper had argued that
the senior bore the responsibility of having an adequate means of diversion. Not-
ing the effect would be to create a race to the bottom of the aquifer or would
unduly favor the party with the financial means to engage in such a race, the
court rejected this argument, stating: "If subsequent appropriators desire to en-
gage in such a contest the financial burden must rest on them and with no injury
to the prior appropriators or loss of their water." Id. at 1114. But see Baker v.
Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1973) (holding that the Idaho Ground
Water Act overturns the Noh holding).
128. Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews, 344 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1959).
129. Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978).
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against the junior pumper, based on the cost of deepening the domes-
tic wells. 130
In general, existing well owners are only protected from "unreason-
able" lowering of groundwater levels beyond their economic means to
reach. For some irrigators using groundwater to grow low-value
crops, that level may not be very deep. Thus, a physical solution of
paying to deepen wells and defray added pumping costs may still pro-
vide a useful means of enabling additional uses of water.
The manner in which surface water is diverted also can affect the
availability of water for other uses. The well-known case of Schodde v.
Twin Falls Land & Water Co.,131 involved a challenge by a junior ap-
propriator to a senior's right to continue to divert water using a water
wheel. Continued operation of the water wheel to divert water would
have prevented operation of a diversion dam that had been con-
structed on the Snake River in Idaho to enable irrigation of hundreds
of thousands of acres of land.132 The U.S. Supreme Court held the
water wheel to be an unreasonable means of diversion under the facts
of this case.13 3
130. The court based its decision on the preference accorded domestic users under Ne-
braska law. Id. at 9-10, 261 N.W.2d at 771.
131. 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
132. The dam backed up water, slowing or stopping the river current required for op-
eration of the water wheel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asked:
Is this current and the means adopted for the diversion of the appropri-
ated water part of or attached to plaintiffs right of appropriation? It is
contended on the part of the plaintiff that the current of the river is nec-
essarily appurtenant to the water location, and that the means of utiliz-
ing that current is attached as an appurtenance to the appropriation.
We have not been referred to any case-and we know of none-where
either of these propositions have been upheld.
Id. at 120.
133. In examining the trial court opinion:
The trial court recognized fully the right of the plaintiff to the volume of
water actually appropriated for a beneficial purpose. It nevertheless dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that there was no right under the
Constitution and laws of the State of Idaho to appropriate the current of
the river so as to render it impossible for others to apply the otherwise
unappropriated waters of the river to beneficial uses. The court did not
find it necessary to deny that power might be one of the beneficial pur-
poses for which appropriations of water might be made, but in substance
held that to uphold as an appropriation the use of the current of the river
to the extent required to work the defendant's wheels would amount to
saying that a limited taking of water from the river by appropriation for
a limited beneficial use justified the appropriation of all the water in the
river as incident to the limited benefit resulting from the use of the
water actually appropriated.
Id. at 117. While not involved in this case, a physical solution would have been
to pay for the installation of a different means of diversion or otherwise provide
replacement water to the senior.
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Courts have struggled with applying this reasonable-means-of-di-
version requirement. 13 4 As in Schodde, the issue has arisen most
commonly in situations in which the means of diversion relied on by
the existing user precluded subsequent valuable uses. The would-be
users generally sought a declaration that the senior was not protected
in his method of diversion against the subsequent use. Thus, for ex-
ample, in Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 135 the Oregon Supreme
Court upheld a decision by the State Engineer to allow construction of
storage facilities that would reduce the flow of water into a natural
lake, the overflow from which naturally irrigated lands of objectors.
The court recognized the objectors' legal right to the water but held
that right did not include the means of diversion: "We hold that the
method of diversion by way of natural overflow is a privilege only and
cannot be insisted upon by the objectors if it interferes with the appro-
priation by others of the waters for a beneficial use."136 In most cases,
however, after stating the general principle that water must be benefi-
134. See, e.g., State ex rel. Crowley v. District Court, 88 P.2d 23, 27 (Mont. 1939) ("We
think the original taker or appropriator from a stream or a body of water also
acquires the right to continue to use his method or means of diverting which he
has installed."). A statement of the law in general is provided in United States. v.
Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428 (9th. Cir 1994):
The law of appropriation does not dictate that the senior user must use
the most efficient diversion system. While it is true that "[t]he owner of a
water right has no right as against a junior appropriator to waste water,
i.e., to divert more than can be used beneficially," Weibert v. Rothe Bros.,
Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Colo. 1980), neither does he have to be 100%
efficient. The [Upper Valley Defendants] are correct in asserting that
Schodde v. Twin Falls Land and Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912), in part
stands for the assertion that the means of diversion must be reasonably
efficient and not wasteful. However, when ditches and flumes are the
usual and ordinary means of diverting water, "parties who have made
their appropriations by such means cannot be compelled to substitute
iron pipes, though they may be compelled to keep their flumes and
ditches in good repair so as to prevent any unnecessary waste." Barrows
v. Fox, 32 P. 811, 812 (Cal. 1893). Here, unlined ditches are the usual
and ordinary means of diverting water. Therefore, the Apache Tribe can
no more be compelled to line their canals (which the UVDs do not gener-
ally do) than they could be required to substitute iron pipes.
Id. at 1433-34.
135. 336 P.2d 884 (Or. 1959). The court stated:
It is claimed that the impoundment of the waters in the proposed reser-
voirs will reduce the flow of waters to Hart Lake from Twentymile Creek
and Deep Creek. Those objectors who rely upon the overflow of Hart
Lake to irrigate their lands contend that the retention of the water by
the applicant would interfere with this overflow and would constitute an
impairment of their vested right to such waters. It is claimed that the
right to this method of irrigation by natural overflow and drainage was
acquired by use, and affirmed by the 1929 adjudication of the water
rights in Warner Valley. One of the questions before us is whether such
a right exists.
Id. at 888.
136. Id. at 889.
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cially used and not wasted, the courts go on to find the practices ac-
ceptable-usually because they are the same as those used by
everyone else.137 In short, courts generally have been reluctant to im-
pose a duty on seniors to make changes in water use practices for the
benefit of juniors.13s
A well-known California case, Tulare Irrigation District v. Lind-
say-Strathmore Irrigation District,139 illustrates the potential in such
situations for a physical solution. This case involved a dispute be-
tween a large group of existing users with various legal rights to use
related surface and groundwater resources and a user proposing to
withdraw additional groundwater for use in another location. Ex-
isting users argued they would be injured by this new use. Among
other things, the proponent argued the existing uses were wasteful
and not deserving of legal protection.140 After making the usual state-
137. Discussing diversion, the California Supreme Court stated:
While an appropriator can claim only the amount which is necessary to
properly supply his needs, and can permit no water to go to waste, he is
not bound, as here claimed, to adopt the best method for utilizing the
water or take extraordinary precautions to prevent waste. He is entitled
to make a reasonable use of the water according to the custom of the
locality, and, as long as he does so, other persons cannot complain of his
acts. The amount of water required to irrigate his lands should, there-
fore, be determined by reference to the system used, although it may
result in some waste which might be avoided by the adoption of another
or more elaborate and extensive distribution system. Farnham on Wa-
ters, § 675; Wiel on Water Rights (3d Ed.) § 481; Barrows v. Fox, 32 P.
811 (Cal. 1893).
Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 276 P. 1017, 1024 (Cal. 1929).
138. But see Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App., 3d
Dist. 1971) (overturning a finding that ditch losses of 83.33 percent of the water
diverted over 2.5 miles were reasonable in a quiet title action to the entire flow of
a small creek in the Sierra Nevada mountains).
139. 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935).
140. The court explained:
Appellant also contends that, because of the alleged poor methods of di-
version used by respondents excessive quantities of water are used by
them. There can be no doubt that respondents as a group do not divert
the water in the most scientific manner. There can be no doubt that in
some cases, because of the paralleling of the ditches of some of the re-
spondents, there is an uneconomic use of water. If all of the respondents
constituted one appropriating unit, then perhaps there would be some
merit in appellant's contention that respondents' methods are wasteful.
But these various appropriators are not one unit-each one has its own
appropriative right, gained by many years of use. The courts cannot and,
even if they had the power, should not compel these appropriators, many
of whom have been diverting water for over fifty years, at their expense,
to build new systems of diversion.
... It is true that most of the ditches of the respondents are earthen
ditches and that, in the porous soils of the delta there is a resulting large
conveyance loss caused by seepage. Respondents concede that under the
system now prevailing on the delta there is a conveyance loss of between
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ments about the importance of making efficient use of water the court
concluded:
It must be remembered that respondents' appropriative rights long antedate
any right of the appellant to any water at all for use on nonriparian lands.
The prior rights of respondents, regardless of the great needs of appellant,
must be protected. Respondents have developed a system of diversion and use
on the Delta that has made that region one of the most prosperous and pro-
ductive portions of California. We cannot hold, for reasons already stated,
that respondents' methods of diversion and methods of use are wasteful. If
appellant sincerely desires to save some of the conveyance loss, on the retrial,
it can offer to defray the expenses of straightening some of the major ditches,
or of building, in some cases, impervious ditches. Moreover, the trial court
should not lose sight of the fact that this is an equity case. The equity courts
possess broad powers and should exercise them so as to do substantial justice.
Heretofore, the equity courts, in water cases, apparently have not seen fit to
work out physical solutions of the problems presented, unless such solutions
have been suggested by the parties. But it should be kept in mind that the
equity court is not bound or limited by the suggestions or offers made by the
parties to this, or any similar, action. For purposes of illustration, if the trial
court, on the retrial, comes to the conclusion, based upon proper evidence, that
a substantial saving can be effected at a reasonable cost, by repairing or
changing some of the ditches, as above mentioned, it undoubtedly has the
power regardless of whether the parties have suggested the particular physi-
cal solution or not, to make its injunctive order subject to conditions which it
may suggest and to apportion the cost thereof as justice may require, keeping
in mind the fact that respondents have prior rights and cannot be required
lawfully to incur any material expense in order to accommodate appellant. 141
In addition to its support of a physical solution, this decision suggests
an affirmative role for trial courts in such disputes to promote or even
impose such an approach. 142
Utah courts also have approved the use of physical solutions to en-
able new uses by improving existing users' means of diversion. For
example, Salt Lake City challenged an application to appropriate
water in Utah Lake on the basis that there was no unappropriated
water available.143 In fact, the trial court found that unappropriated
water was available, but the usability of the water was limited by the
broad and shallow nature of the lake and the limited amount of water
moving out of the lake and into the Jordan River. Relying on evidence
that the total usable quantity of water could be increased by improv-
ing the senior appropriators' method of diversion of water out of Utah
Lake, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the junior appropriation.
40 to 45 per cent. Appellant contends that reasonably such conveyance
loss should not exceed 30 per cent.
Id. at 1009.
141. Id. at 1010.
142. In some more recent decisions, the California Supreme Court has backed away
from this position somewhat, at least to the extent such solutions are viewed as
impairing existing water rights. See, e.g., City of Barstow v. Mojave Water
Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
143. Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 114 P. 147 (Utah 1911).
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But we can see no good reason for denying a subsequent application for unap-
propriated water simply because to allow such an application might require a
change in the prior appropriator's means of diversion, provided such a change
can be made without affecting the prior appropriator's ultimate rights of ap-
plying all of his water to the purposes selected by him. If all rights can be
protected and preserved, a mere change in prior established means or meth-
ods of diversion, if possible, ought not to prevent the use of water which could
otherwise not be beneficially applied. But, in our judgment, the risk of inter-
fering with prior rights and the cost of any change in the prior appropriator's
means or methods of diversion should be assumed and borne by the subse-
quent appropriator, and a court should in no case permit a subsequent appro-
priation unless all prior rights can by some feasible means be protected and
maintained. 144
In another case, the Utah Supreme Court considered a proposal to
pipe water to senior household users during the winter months in re-
turn for being able to store the stream flows historically diverted to
supply domestic uses.14 5 The trial court had found that these winter-
time users required at least ten cubic feet per second ("cfs") of diver-
sions to obtain one cfs of use and that construction of the pipeline for
delivery of water would enable the applicant to store a substantial
quantity of water without loss of water to existing users. The Utah
Supreme Court held that, if the applicant can in fact deliver water to
existing users, the saved water would be available for his
appropriation: 146
The issue here to be decided is whether, if he does accomplish his design, the
water so rescued from loss may be awarded to him. His appropriation is de-
pendent upon the execution of his scheme. If he cannot carry it out, he cannot
perfect his appropriation. He must meet and overcome whatever obstacles
may cross his path. 147
Colorado has embraced the policy of promoting "maximum utiliza-
tion" of its water resources. This policy first emerged in the context of
a dispute involving impacts to senior surface water diverters from a
river caused by groundwater withdrawals from junior wells.148
Straightforward application of the priority system would have re-
quired curtailment of wells that were a critical source of water for irri-
gated agriculture. Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court urged the
State to search for mechanisms that would enable continued use of
junior wells, so long as they could be pumped without injury to senior
water rights. 149 By way of rationalization of this deviation from the
priority system, the court offered this statement:
144. Id. at 153.
145. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116 (Utah 1930).
146. Id. at 119.
147. Id. One such obstacle might be the refusal of an existing user to switch to taking
water from a pipeline.
148. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
149. Id. at 993.
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As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is open-
ing on the new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that
doctrine can be integrated into the law of vested rights. We have known for a
long time that the doctrine was lurking in the backstage shadows as a result
of the accepted though often violated principle that the right to water does not
give the right to waste it.150
As described supra, integration of junior well users has proceeded
primarily on the basis of providing replacement water to offset their
depletions to the stream. The Colorado Supreme Court also has sug-
gested the possibility that surface water users shift to using wells to
receive their water.15 1 Noting the need in some situations for a large
quantity of groundwater in alluvial aquifers to support a relatively
small flow of surface water, the court indicated that a well might sim-
ply represent a more efficient means of diversion for a surface water
right: "A reasonable means of diversion in this case, it is argued, is one
that eliminates the need for supporting the surface stream, thereby
freeing the underground water for maximum beneficial use."15 2 It
suggested that the burden of paying the cost of such wells might rest
with junior appropriators. 15 3
Physical conditions affecting availability of surface water have
sometimes provided an opportunity for physical solutions. Perhaps
the most common situation has involved stream channel reaches, in
which surface flows seep readily into the underlying ground (so-called
"losing" reaches), resulting in large "losses" of stream flows. By build-
ing a ditch on less permeable soils to carry water around such reaches,
or even constructing pipelines for this purpose, water can be delivered
to downstream users that otherwise would not be available in the
stream channel.
In some cases, courts have been willing to allow upstream juniors
who make these physical improvements to increase their diversions by
the amount of water deemed to have been "saved." A good example is
provided in an 1896 California case in which an upstream riparian
constructed a dam by means of which it diverted the entire flow of the
river into a ditch.154 The bed of the channel below this point was de-
scribed as sandy and porous so that, at times of low flow, no surface
water reached the next tract of land downstream. The downstream
150. Id. at 994. In its revision of Colorado statutory law the General Assembly in-
cluded as one of the basic tenets of that law: "[I]t is the policy of this state to
integrate the appropriation, use, and administration of underground water tribu-
tary to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the waters of this state." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-
102(1)(a) (West 2003).
151. Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo.
1983).
152. Id. at 934.
153. Id. at 935.
154. Wiggins v. Muscupiabe Land & Water Co., 45 P. 160 (Cal. 1896).
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riparian brought an action to enjoin use of the dam. The trial court
ordered rotation of the full surface flow during the irrigation season
and included a provision allowing the upstream user to take and use
that amount of water determined to have been "lost" in the channel
passing through its lands prior to reaching the downstream user in
return for constructing a ditch to deliver water directly to the user's
land. 155 The California Supreme Court upheld this provision, stating:
The plaintiff could under no circumstances be entitled to the use of more
water than would reach his land by the natural flow of the stream, and, if he
receives this flow upon his land, it is immaterial to him whether it is received
by means of the natural course of the stream, or by artificial means. On the
other hand, if the defendant is enabled by artificial means to give to the plain-
tiff all of the water he is entitled to receive, no reason can be assigned why it
should not be permitted to divert from the stream, where it enters its land,
and preserve and utilize, the 100 inches, which would otherwise be lost by
absorption and evaporation. 1 5 6
In a 1922 Idaho case, a party that had constructed a pipe to carry
surface waters from a losing stream to another stream sought credit
not only for savings from stream channel losses but also from losses
from the downstream appropriators' ditch.157 Evidence indicated a
ten percent loss in the stream channel between the diversion pipe and
the headgate of the downstream diversion and losses greater than
fifty percent between the headgate and the place of use. By piping
water directly into the other stream for use it was claimed there had
been a savings of thirty-three cfs of water.158 The Idaho Supreme
Court awarded the ten percent savings, agreeing: "To that extent it
has materially augmented the amount of water available from the
stream for beneficial use and should have a prior right to its use."159
The court rejected, however, the claim for ditch savings on the basis
that this was an unreasonable loss of water, to which the diverters
had no right.160
155. Evidence indicated that 100 inches of water were lost to the channel in the
stream reach passing through the upstream riparian's land. The court allowed
the upstream user the right to use this amount of water if it delivered all water in
excess of 100 inches to the downstream user when its rotation time occurred. Id.
at 164.
156. Id.
157. Basinger v. Taylor, 211 P. 1085 (Idaho 1922), modifying 164 P. 522 (Idaho 1917).
158. The constructor of the pipeline asserted it was necessary for fifty-five cubic feet
per second to reach the headgate and that, of the forty-seven cfs diverted at the
headgate, only twenty-two cfs reached the place of use. Thus, it argued it was
entitled to the thirty-three cfs it has "saved" by building the pipeline. Id. at 1086.
159. Id.
160. Id. The Idaho court explained:
A water user is entitled to allowance for only a reasonable loss in con-
ducting his water from the point of diversion to the place of use. The loss
of 50 per cent in the Farmers' ditch between the old point of diversion of
the individual appellants and the place where they applied the water on
their land was not a reasonable loss.
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In at least one case, a court has approved upstream junior diver-
sion of water on a tributary, based on evidence that the return flows
reached the main stream below a losing reach, so that downstream
seniors still received their full appropriation. 16 1 The upstream junior
had constructed a dam to enable its diversion of water. Downstream
seniors removed the dam to allow water to pass. Juniors sought a
court order to prevent such interference with their dam and alleged
that none of the water they diverted ever reached the main stream
during the low-flow months because of seepage into the ground. The
Utah Supreme Court determined that, as a legal matter, senior rights
are satisfied so long as the appropriated quantity of water reaches
their headgate, whether it comes through the natural channel or by
some other means:
Therefore, if respondents can, by turning the water into their canals, deliver
to appellants the amount to which they are entitled and at the same time save
to themselves the amount of water ranging from 10 to 30 second feet, which
the weight of the evidence shows is lost by absorption and evaporation when
the water is permitted to flow down its natural channel, they ought to be per-
mitted to do so. 1 6 2
Recognizing the substantial inefficiencies of many water diversion
and use practices, the courts, reluctant to impose a strict legal duty on
existing users, have invited those who want the benefits of more effi-
cient uses to pay for their installation. It is an invitation increasingly
likely to be taken as other options become less attractive. Perhaps the
best known example to date is the arrangement between the Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California ("MWD") and the Impe-
rial Irrigation District, by which MWD funded the concrete lining of
major portions of the All American Canal in return for the right to use
the conserved water. 16 3 Making this an especially attractive opportu-
nity was the fact MWD could use all of the conserved water because
there were no downstream users with legally protected rights to this
water. 164 In a somewhat similar situation physically, the Bureau of
Reclamation made structural improvements to the main canal in its
Grand Valley Project, allowing reduced diversions of water at the
Roller Dam on the Colorado River, while still providing the same
amount of water to users in the valley.165 In this case, the motivation
was to improve instream flows of the river as it passes through a reach
with habitat critical to an endangered species of fish.
Id. (citations omitted).
161. Fuller v. Sharp, 94 P. 813 (Utah 1908).
162. Id. at 817.
163. Gray, supra note 63, at 35-39.
164. The All American Canal takes water from the Colorado River just above the in-
ternational boundary with Mexico. The canal traverses arid lands just to the
north of the international boundary on its way to the Imperial Valley.
165. MAcDONNELL, supra note 57, at 127-30.
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Such opportunities abound in the West. In most cases, improve-
ments in water diversion and use efficiency will not yield significant
quantities of consumptively usable water.1 6 6 More often, benefits will
be tied to those related to reduced diversions of water, or perhaps to
reductions in water-quality-impairing return flows of water. Never-
theless, physical solutions involving changes of existing systems of
water use, paid for by those interested in the change, provide another
option for meeting changing interests in water.
III. ISSUES IN REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATION OF
OUT-OF-PRIORITY WATER USES
A. Overview of State Approaches
Because out-of-priority water uses are not in strict conformity with
the prior appropriation system, they generally operate under some
form of state supervision. Most commonly, application must be made
to the state water resources management agency in the same manner
as if requesting a new appropriation or a change of use. Common to
all such reviews is the requirement of causing no injury to other ap-
propriators. If involuntary replacement of water is involved, water
quality considerations may be included along with the more obvious
consideration of water quantity.
Colorado has the most extensive statutory treatment for out-of-pri-
ority water uses. Certain of these uses, primarily those regarded as
water management activities involving existing water rights, are sub-
ject to State Engineer oversight. Thus, the State Engineer supervises
out-of-priority water storage upon the condition such stored water will
be released and delivered to the downstream senior storage right
"whenever needed by such senior for actual use."167 Similarly, ex-
changes based on the addition of water to one stream from another
stream are to be monitored by the State Engineer to account for losses
due to seepage and evaporation. 168 The State Engineer also is di-
rected to monitor exchanges between reservoirs and ditches and to re-
quire use of measuring devices as necessary. 16 9 Such exchanges may
require a "reasonable deduction" for any associated losses of water.
The State Engineer also may issue well permits for gravel mining op-
erations that create open water ponds, either on the basis of a court-
decreed plan for augmentation or through approval of a substitute
supply plan. 170 Finally, the State Engineer may approve temporary
166. For a discussion see MAcDONNELL, supra note 57, at 240-41.
167. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-80-120(1) (West 2003).
168. Id. § 37-83-101.
169. Id. § 37-83-104.
170. Replacement water need not account for "historic natural depletion... caused by
the preexisting natural vegetative cover.., replaced by an open water surface."
Id. § 37-80-120(5).
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substitute water supply plans in certain other limited
circumstances. 17 1
Uses based on establishing a new or changed water right must be
reviewed and approved by the water court. By statute, exchanges or
substitutions of water may also be treated as an appropriation of
water, and an application for determination of such appropriation
may be filed with the water court. 17 2 Exchanges may be included as
part of a plan for augmentation, or they may be regarded as a change
of water right.17 3 "Plan for augmentation" is defined as:
[a] detailed program, which may be either temporary or perpetual in duration,
to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use in a division or
portion thereof by the development of new or alternate means or points of
diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by water exchange projects, by pro-
viding substitute supplies of water, by the development of new sources of
water, or by any other appropriate means. 1 7 4
In addition, the water court is authorized to make determinations of
water rights including "approval of a proposed or existing exchange of
water under section 37-80-120 or 37-83-104."175 In such determina-
tions, "the original priority date or priority dates of the exchange shall
be recognized and preserved unless such recognition or preservation
would be contrary to the manner in which such exchange has been
administered."17 6
Court review of a proposed plan for augmentation is focused prima-
rily on matters of potential injury to other appropriators. 177 Any such
171. Id. § 37-92-308. See also Michael F. Browning, Substitute Supply Plans: Recent
Water Law Developments, 31 COLO. LAw. 67, 69-70 (Aug. 2002). New out-of-pri-
ority depletions for up to five years may be the subject of a temporary plan. In
addition to a requirement of notice to other parties, the statute requires the State
Engineer to go through a considerable review process:
The state engineer, after consideration of the comments received, has
determined that the operation and administration of such plan will re-
place all out-of-priority depletions in time, location, and amount and will
otherwise prevent injury to other water rights and decreed conditional
water rights, including water quality and continuity to meet the require-
ments of use to which the senior appropriation has normally been put,
pursuant to section 37-80-120(3) and will not impair compliance with
any interstate compacts. The state engineer shall impose such terms
and conditions as are necessary to ensure that these standards are met.
In making the determinations specified in this subparagraph (IV), the
state engineer shall not be required to hold any formal hearings or con-
duct any other formal proceedings, but may conduct a hearing or formal
proceeding if the state engineer finds it necessary to address the issues.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-308(5)(a)(IV) (West 2003).
172. Id. § 37-80-120(4).
173. Id. §§ 37-92-103(9), 37-92-302(1)(a).
174. Id. § 37-92-103(9).
175. Id. § 37-92-302(1)(a).
176. Id. § 37-92-305(10).
177. Id. § 37-92-305(3) ("A change of water right or plan for augmentation, including
water exchange project, shall be approved if such change or plan will not injuri-
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injury may be offset through addition of terms and conditions.X78 De-
tailed guidance is provided for review of plans for augmentation:
In reviewing a proposed plan for augmentation and in considering terms and
conditions that may be necessary to avoid injury, the referee or the water
judge shall consider the depletions from an applicant's use or proposed use of
water, in quantity and in time, the amount and timing of augmentation water
that would be provided by the applicant, and the existence, if any, of injury to
any owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a
decreed conditional water right. A plan for augmentation shall be sufficient to
permit the continuation of diversions when curtailment would otherwise be
required to meet a valid senior call for water, to the extent that the applicant
shall provide replacement water necessary to meet the lawful requirements of
a senior diverter at the time and location and to the extent the senior would be
deprived of his or her lawful entitlement by the applicant's diversion. A pro-
posed plan for augmentation that relies upon a supply of augmentation water
which, by contract or otherwise, is limited in duration shall not be denied
solely upon the ground that the supply of augmentation water is limited in
duration, so long as the terms and conditions of the plan prevent injury to
vested water rights. Said terms and conditions shall require replacement of
out-of-priority depletions that occur after any groundwater diversions cease.
Decrees approving plans for augmentation shall require that the state engi-
neer curtail all out-of-priority diversions, the depletions from which are not so
replaced as to prevent injury to vested water rights. A plan for augmentation
may provide procedures to allow additional or alternative sources of replace-
ment water, including water leased on a yearly or less frequent basis, to be
used in the plan after the initial decree is entered if the use of said additional
or alternative sources is part of a substitute water supply plan approved pur-
suant to section 37-92-308 or if such sources are decreed for such use.1 7 9
Colorado law also provides:
In the case of plans for augmentation including exchange, the supplier may
take an equivalent amount of water at his point of diversion or storage if such
water is available without impairing the rights of others. Any substituted
water shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet the requirements for
which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been used, and such
substituted water shall be accepted by the senior appropriator in substitution
for water derived by the exercise of his decreed rights. 1 8 0
Arizona enacted detailed statutory provisions related to exchanges
in 1992.181 If surface water is involved, application to the department
of water resources is required. Approval is based on findings that (1)
the water exchange is subject to a written agreement; (2) the exchange
will not affect vested rights to water; and (3) each party to the ex-
change contract has the right to the water exchanged.18 2 Notice of the
ously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water
right or a decreed conditional water right.").
178. Id.
179. Id. § 37-92-305(8).
180. Id. § 37-92-305(5).
181. H.B. 2407, 40th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1992).
182. Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1041(A) (West 2003).
2004] OUT-OF-PRIORITY WATER USE
application is required, and objections may be filed.183 A hearing may
be held if objections are filed.184
Idaho's statute providing for exchanges requires that an applica-
tion be filed with the department of water resources.' 8 5 Exchanges
are either between two water rights or involve taking water in return
for other water.1 8 6 An exchange under an existing right follows a
somewhat different procedure than an exchange involving a new ap-
propriation of water.' 8 7 Applications based on an exchange between
water rights must include a copy of the written agreement. 8 8 Ap-
proval of an exchange is based on findings that (1) no other water
rights are injured; (2) there is not an enlargement of the original right;
(3) the exchange is "consistent with the conservation of water re-
sources within the state of Idaho"; (4) the exchange is in the local pub-
lic interest; and (5) the exchange will not adversely affect the local
economy or local area if the place of use is outside the area where the
water originates.I8 9 Approvals are conditioned to limit exchanges to
times in which water is available to satisfy the exchange.
Nebraska limits exchanges to holders of permits to appropriate
stored water.190 Holders of such permits may apply for a permit to
divert water from the stream either upstream or downstream of the
reservoir for irrigation of land in exchange for the stored water. 191 Ap-
183. Id. § 45-1042(B), (C).
184. Id.
185. IDAHO CODE § 42-240(1) (Michie 2003).
186. Id. § 42-105(2) ("The water that a person is entitled to divert by reason of a valid
water right, or water that a person is seeking to appropriate, may be exchanged
for water under another water right, or for other water from the same or another
source . . ").
187. Compare Id. § 42-240 (requiring that an existing right-holder desiring to ex-
change water apply to the director of the department of water resources before
making an exchange, allowing objectors to file protests, and allowing input from
the district watermaster), with § 42-105(2)(b) (requiring that persons desiring to
exchange newly appropriated water file an application and then processing the
application under section 42-203A of the Idaho code, which allows objectors to file
a written protest, requires a formal hearing if such protests are filed, and sub-
jects the hearing to judicial review).
188. Id. §§ 42-240(1), 42-105(2)(b).
189. Id. § 42-240(5). The local public interest is defined at id. § 42-202B.
190. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-242(2) (Reissue 1998 & Supp. 2003).
191. According to Susan France of the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources,
this provision is used in two places in Nebraska. One is a permit enabling the
Lisco Irrigation District to divert natural flow from the North Platte River out of
priority in return for releases of an equal quantity of water from downstream
Lake McConaughy. The other is in the Loup Basin and involves an exchange by
which the upstream Sargent Irrigation District diverts streamflow out of priority
and the downstream Farwell Irrigation District releases an equivalent amount of
water from its reservoir. Personal Communication from Susan France, Div. Man-
ager, Water Rights Admin., Neb. Dep't of Natural Res., April 9, 2004.
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proval is subject to the condition that prior appropriators shall not be
"adversely affected."19 2
Oregon law allows any holder of a water right to apply to the
Water Resources Commission "for permission to use stored, surface or
ground water from another source in exchange for supplying replace-
ment water in an equal amount to satisfy prior appropriations from
the other source." 19 3 The Commission gives notice of the applica-
tion.19 4 An exchange may be denied if the Commission finds that (1) it
would adversely affect other appropriators, (2) it would be too difficult
to administer, (3) it would adversely affect the public interest, or (4) a
sufficient quantity of replacement water would not be available.19 5
The Commission is authorized to impose conditions on its approval as
it deems necessary.19 6
Utah law contains a provision similar to the ones discussed in Col-
orado and Idaho providing for the ability to divert and use waters ad-
ded to a stream from another source. 19 7 Application must be made to
the State Engineer. The purpose must be to prevent waste and facili-
tate distribution of water. Evaporation and seepage may be deducted
from the quantity allowed to be removed. The diversion may occur
either above or below the point at which water is added to the stream.
Water added to the stream must not deteriorate the quality or dimin-
ish the quantity of the receiving water. The State Engineer may re-
quire the provision of certain information respecting operation of the
exchange. 198
Wyoming authorizes the appropriator of groundwater, surface
water, or storage water to obtain and use additional water from an-
other source as a supplemental supply.19 9 If the additional water
192. Id.
193. OR. REv. STAT. § 540.533(1) (2003). The applicant must show that the source of
their appropriation is insufficient at times, that better conservation and use of
water can be accomplished, or that "[t]he person can develop water for appropria-
tion under the permit for use of water for an in-stream purpose, but cannot eco-
nomically convey the water to its point of use." Id.
194. Id. § 540.535.
195. Id. § 540.537(1). Public interest considerations are found in section 537.170(8).
Adequacy of replacement water is determined by considering "relative consump-
tive uses and transmission losses." Id. § 540.537(1).
196. Id. § 540.537(2).
197. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-20(1) (1989).
198. Such information may include the diversion works, the "extent to which the de-
velopment under the exchange has occurred," actual operation of the exchange,
the continued existence of a legal right to the water used, and "the quantity of
water being exchanged." Id. § 73-3-20(2).
199. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-106(a) (Lexis 2003). The petitioner must demonstrate
either an insufficient supply of water from the original source, that "better con-
servation and utilization of the state's water can be accomplished," or that other
water can be developed but cannot be conveyed economically to its point of use.
The Wyoming and Oregon provisions are substantially the same.
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comes from another appropriator, the agreement authorizing the use
must be provided. Water may come from any other source, including
groundwater. Wyoming law states: "It is the policy of the state to en-
courage exchanges."2 00 Review of such requests is based on considera-
tions of injury to other water rights, the difficulty of administration of
the exchange, and the public interest. In addition, "[a]ll exchanges are
subject to the requirements of beneficial use and equality of water ex-
changed, and no exchange will be allowed unless a sufficient quantity
of makeup water is introduced to replace the water diverted and with-
drawn under the exchange." 20 1
B. Meeting the No-Injury Requirement
Fundamental to out-of-priority water use is that it not harm other
legally-protected water uses. The no-harm standard as applied to out-
of-priority water uses is similar to that applied to changes of water
uses under an existing water right. Protection extends to all other
potentially affected water rights, not just to those senior to the right
being changed. Impairment is measured in terms of reduction in
amounts of water used by other appropriators, changes in the timing
with which water is available, or changes in the quality of water. An
evaluation of harm turns on the facts of each case. The proponent of
the new use bears the burden of demonstrating absence of harm.
There are, however, some differences that are explored in this section.
1. Water Quantity
While riparian law tolerates some "reasonable" degree of interfer-
ence between and among water uses, prior appropriation law tradi-
tionally demands strict protection of seniors as against interference by
juniors as well as protection of all existing appropriations as against
changes of use. In practice, courts often have used as a surrogate for
water-right-by-water-right analysis the standard that actions by ap-
propriators may not change the "stream conditions" upon which other
appropriators depend. An early statement of this standard was pro-
vided by the Colorado Supreme Court:
The rights of a prior appropriator, as against a subsequent appropriator who
changes the place of diversion, are already sufficiently safeguarded by the
fundamental doctrine of so-called "irrigation law." He who is first in time is
first in right. A subsequent appropriator has a vested right, as against his
senior, to insist upon the continuance of the conditions that existed at the
time he made his appropriation, and if a change of place of diversion by a
senior interferes with, or changes those conditions to the prejudice of, a subse-
quent appropriator, the latter may justly complain.2 0 2
200. Id. § 43-3-106(d).
201. Id.
202. Handy Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 62 P. 847, 848 (Colo. 1900) (cita-
tions omitted). See also, Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co., 107 P. 1108,
20041
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The best way to ensure stream conditions will not be altered by the
change of use is to determine the manner in which the original use
altered those conditions through its diversion, use, and return of
water, and to demonstrate that the new use will not further alter the
stream. Usually, the simplest way to ensure no harmful alteration of
a stream is to demonstrate that the new use will not deplete any addi-
tional amount of water so that, considering that amount of water his-
torically diverted from the stream at the original point of diversion
and that amount of water returning unconsumed to the stream, there
is no change in streamflow. As described in one text:
Making a change is an exercise in balancing depletions. The prohibition
against injury is merely a recognition that junior water right owners are enti-
tled to the maintenance of those stream conditions which existed at the time
their appropriations were made. A junior priority holder cannot be said to be
injured if the change of a senior priority imposes no greater or different bur-
den on the stream than existed before the change. Consequently, the engi-
neering and legal issue in any change proceeding is to ensure the new use will
not change the burden on the stream, meaning the quality, quantity, or tim-
ing of water available to junior priorities.2 0 3
So long as all depletions associated with the new use are fully replaced
in quantity, location, and timing to keep the stream unchanged, the
burden of demonstrating no harm is met.
This same approach is generally used to satisfy the no-harm re-
quirement for an out-of-priority water use, and, indeed, many out-of-
priority water uses depend on changes of use of an existing water
right. A good example is provided in the first plan for augmentation
case to reach the Colorado Supreme Court, Cache LaPoudre Water
Users Association v. Glacier View Meadows.204 To provide water for a
new housing development, the plan proposed installation of new
groundwater wells that would withdraw a maximum of approximately
590 acre-feet of water annually from the tributary aquifer underlying
the lands.2 05 Of this amount, no more than eighty-nine acre-feet
1111 (Colo. 1910) ("This court has often said, in substance, that a junior appropri-
ator of water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as against his senior, in a
continuation of conditions on the stream as they existed at the time he made his
appropriation. If this means anything, it is that when the junior appropriator
makes his appropriation he acquires a vested right in the conditions then prevail-
ing upon the stream, and surrounding the general method of use of water there-
from. He has a right to assume that these are fixed conditions and will so
remain, at least without substantial change, unless it appears that a proposed
change will not work harm to his vested rights.").
203. LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER LAw 78
(1987).
204. 550 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1976).
205. Id. at 290. The development would have 1892 units with assumed occupancy of
3.5 people per unit. Water requirements per person were estimated to be eighty
gallons per day. Id.
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would be consumed. 20 6 Replacement water for the depletions of sur-
face water attributable to these withdrawals would be provided to the
stream by releases of water from an upstream reservoir. 20 7 Evidence
indicated prior use of the reservoir water resulted in seventy-five per-
cent of the water being consumed. Thus, releases of this water had to
account for the twenty-five percent that previously had provided re-
turn flows after use to the fully appropriated river system. Moreover,
five percent of the water releases would be dedicated to replace evapo-
ration and seepage during transit. Thus, the plan for augmentation
proposed to commit sufficient replacement water to fully offset not
only depletions associated with the new use, but also to account for
historic return flows and transportation losses associated with the re-
placement water's previous use.20 8
Objectors argued that the developers must replace one hundred
percent of all groundwater withdrawals. 20 9 In answer, the Colorado
Supreme Court simply quoted from those parts of the 1969 Water
Right Determination and Administration Act promoting maximum
use of the State's groundwater and found "that the plan for augmenta-
tion has been formulated and approved consonant with, and in fur-
therance of, the purpose and intent of our recent statutes; and that the
plan is valid."2 10 The court added: "We hold ... that under the plan
206. Id. Evidence indicated 105 units would use evaporation to dispose of sewage,
resulting in one hundred percent consumption. The remaining units would use a
septic system in which an estimated ninety percent of the water would eventually
move to the stream. Id.
207. Id. The issue of year-round use of the wells was addressed by demonstrating that
the replacement water had been used year-round as well. Id. at 290, 295.
208. Plans involving changes of water rights for replacement water face the obligation
to demonstrate historic beneficial use under the replacement water right. In
Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367 (Colo. 1980), the applicant for a new
irrigation well sought to change the point of diversion and place of use of another
well located approximately thirty miles upstream and included a plan for aug-
mentation to provide replacement water from a reservoir to offset additional de-
pletions associated with the new well. The trial court had approved transfer of a
quantity of water determined using a general "duty of water" analysis rather
than an evaluation of actual beneficial use. Id. at 1369. In addition, the trial
court had not considered evidence of historical use associated with the storage
water:
In order to determine the adequacy of the plan to accomplish its in-
tended purpose, it is necessary to consider the adequacy of the replace-
ment water rights. Section 37-92-305 (8), C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Supp.). The
trial court should have allowed evidence with respect to the replacement
water, including the amount and timing, to be made available by exer-
cise of the [storage] rights.
Id. at 1373. The Colorado Supreme Court held the decision in error on that ac-
count and remanded. Id. at 1374.
209. Cache LaPoudre, 550 P.2d at 293.
210. Id.
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for augmentation involved water is available for appropriation when
the diversion thereof does not injure holders of vested rights."2 11
In some cases, however, this standard of keeping the stream un-
changed may not make sense. For example, exchanges almost always
involve changing stream conditions between the upstream and down-
stream points of diversion. Determination of possible injury to other
diverters in this affected stream reach requires an analysis of the
streamflow change associated with the exchange to demonstrate that
intervening rights are still able to divert their legal entitlement. It is
for this reason that exchanges in Colorado increasingly are made as
an independent water right, so that a priority may be obtained to rely
on existing stream conditions that enable the exchange.212 Provision
must be made to cease operation of an exchange if these rights would
otherwise be harmed.
The traditional concept of an exchange is based on swapping
equivalent quantities of water.2 13 Yet, there does not seem to be any
absolute reason to limit voluntary exchanges to this standard. So long
as the parties themselves agree to the exchange, the particulars
should not concern others except to the extent there might be some
injury to their rights.
Similarly, as demonstrated in Cache LaPoudre,214 the concept of
replacement water is less concerned with the amount of water used by
the new use and more concerned with ensuring that there is no im-
pairment to the quantities of water legally available to other appropri-
ators. If in fact more water is used than before, it does not matter, so
long as other appropriators are not injured.
Finally, under a physical solution, the objective often is to enable
an existing use to continue but using less water. Such an approach is
explicitly based on the understanding that it is the use that is pro-
tected by a water right and not necessarily any fixed quantity of
water.
2. Water Quality
Only two states, Utah and Colorado, include by statute the re-
quirement that the quality of the replacement water can be a basis for
211. Id. at 293-94.
212. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 118.
213. Wyoming law requires an "equality of water exchanged." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-
3-106(d) (Michie 2003). In contrast, Arizona law specifically acknowledges ex-
changes need not be for an equivalent quantity of water. A water exhange is
defined as "a trade between one or more persons . . . of any water for any other
water, if each party has a right to claim or use the water it gives in trade." ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1001(6) (West 2003). This definition applies, "whether or
not water is traded in equal amounts or other consideration is included in the
trade." Id.
214. 550 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1976).
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finding injury. 21 5 The issue emerged early in Utah because of the de-
sire of junior urban appropriators to exchange lower quality water for
higher quality water. In 1925, an applicant sought to exchange water
from Utah Lake for an equivalent quantity of water from Little Cot-
tonwood Creek.2 16 A water company with existing rights to appropri-
ate water from the creek objected on the basis that the quality of
water from Utah Lake was substantially lower than the quality of the
creek water. Noting the statutory requirement that water added to a
stream from another source must not cause the stream water to be
"deteriorated in quality," the Utah Supreme Court upheld the denial
of the exchange. 2 1 7
Most water use from Little Cottonwood Creek was for irrigation,
but some appropriators also used stream water for domestic purposes.
The applicant proposed to supply these drinking water uses at his own
expense with water delivered through a pipeline from the stream
above the point at which the exchange water would be added. A dis-
senting justice pointed out the potentially limiting effect of the court's
ruling-that it disregarded the actual use to which the water was be-
ing put and, in effect, established a vested right in the irrigators to
have water of a quality higher than necessary for their purpose:
The adoption of a rule of law that an appropriator of water suitable for culi-
nary uses has a vested right to use such water for irrigation purposes when
other water equally suitable for irrigation is made available to such appropri-
ator without any additional cost to him might well tend to retard the develop-
ment of this state as much as would the adoption of a rule of law recognizing
that an appropriator of water has a vested right to use more water than is
reasonable necessary.
2 1 8
This debate continued in subsequent cases. Thus, in 1938, the
Utah Supreme Court considered the value of water rights in Big Cot-
tonwood Creek, allegedly interfered with under an exchange agree-
ment with Salt Lake City. 2 19 The plaintiff had not joined in the
exchange agreement, though he received high quality water for do-
mestic purposes from the city water supply. In his action he sought
damages from the city for taking the native creek water in exchange
for Utah Lake water. The majority opinion held the plaintiffs rights
were to the quality of water available in the source appropriated, and
damages to his rights should be measured by the market value of the
original water rights. 22 0 In a subsequent case concerning the mone-
tary value of water rights from Big Cottonwood Creek taken through
215. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-80-120(3), 37-92-305(5) (West 2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 73-3-20(1) (1989).
216. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116 (1930).
217. Id. at 119.
218. Id. at 120 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. Shurtleffv. Salt Lake City, 82 P.2d 561 (Utah 1938).
220. Id. at 564.
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eminent domain, the court continued to follow this view. 22 1 A lengthy
dissent reviewed the status of water quality under prior appropriation
law. 22 2 Viewing water quality through the beneficial use dimension of
prior appropriation, the dissent argued that water rights are only pro-
tected to the extent of use. Thus, the water quality of an appropria-
tion for irrigation is only protected to the extent needed for that use-
not necessarily to the actual quality of the water used.
In a later case, the Utah Supreme Court followed a somewhat dif-
ferent approach. There, Salt Lake City challenged an exchange appli-
cation to move points of diversion for domestic use of the water of Mill
Creek to upstream springs. 223 The Utah Supreme Court found the
resultant diminution in water quality from this upstream removal of
water to be acceptable, especially given the city's present use of the
water for irrigation and the need for treatment if the water were to be
used for an urban water supply: "There is also no showing that this
change will cause added expense or trouble to keep this water free
from contamination, or to purify it therefrom."224
The first Colorado case to address the issue of water quality effects
associated with an exchange is A-B Cattle Co. v. United States. 2 25 As
part of a federal reclamation project, the United States constructed a
dam on the Arkansas River above the City of Pueblo. The reservoir
inundated that portion of the river at which the Bessemer Irrigating
Ditch Company diverted water. In the associated condemnation ac-
tion, the company argued that its water rights had been diminished in
value, because water now delivered to its users from the reservoir
through its ditch no longer contained the silt historically part of the
river's water. The silt was valuable, the company argued, for coating
the earthen ditch, laterals, and irrigated fields, thereby reducing ero-
sion, reducing seepage loss of water, and inhibiting the growth of un-
desired water-using vegetation. The company asked for payment of
damages associated with these adverse effects to its water rights
caused by the substitution of clear reservoir water for silty river
water.
Acknowledging the statutory obligation for substituted water to be
"of a quality and continuity to meet the requirements of use to which
the senior appropriation has normally been put,"2 2 6 the Colorado Su-
preme Court held that the company's water right did not require con-
tinued availability of silty water.2 27  The majority ruled an
221. Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882 (Utah 1947).
222. Id. at 888-903 (Wolfe, J., dissenting).
223. Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 270 P.2d 453 (Utah
1954).
224. Id. at 456.
225. 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1979).
226. Id. at 59 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-80-120(3) (West 2003)).
227. Id. at 59-60.
[Vol. 83:485
OUT-OF-PRIORITY WATER USE
appropriation is "for water, and not for water containing silt."228 The
loss of silt associated with storing water in a reservoir does not, the
court ruled, constitute "an unreasonable deterioration in quality."
22 9
The dissent found evidence of a long-standing intention in Colo-
rado water law to protect the quality of water relied on by an appropri-
ator from impairment associated with changes in historical conditions.
It summarized this view in the following manner: "The core of an ap-
propriator's protected expectations is that he will be able to continue
to apply to beneficial use that amount and quality of water, within a
reasonable range of acceptability, which he has historically ap-
plied."230 Later, the dissent added:
The question of what constitutes a "diminution" in the quality of water must,
therefore, be analyzed in terms of the use to which the water is put. An appro-
priator's expectations can just as easily be defeated by altering the quality of
water as by changing the quantity. Thus, one aspect of an appropriation is
the right to continue to receive water of the quality upon which the appropria-
tor relied in making his appropriation. Because the defendants in this case
altered the quality of the water which the plaintiffs receive, plaintiffs have
been deprived of a quantity of water which they historically received and put
to beneficial use.2
3 1
The cities of Florence and Cafion City challenged applications for
exchange decrees filed by the Board of Waterworks of Pueblo, in part
because resultant reduced flow levels in the intervening reach of the
Arkansas River into which they released treated water would require
more expensive treatment to meet regulatory requirements. 23 2 In
granting the decrees, the water court specifically found the treated
effluent would be "of a quality and continuity to meet the require-
ments of use to which senior appropriations downstream of the outfall
of the Pueblo Waste Water Treatment Plant have normally been
put."23 3 Moreover, the court decree included a condition that the
flows of the river in the reach of concern to the cities could not be
reduced by an exchange below a minimum flow rate determined to be
sufficient to avoid the need for additional treatment.2
34
In a case involving a complicated set of transactions intended to
bring water to the City of Thornton, the Colorado Supreme Court con-
sidered a challenge related to the quality of a substitute supply of
228. Id. at 59.
229. Id. at 60.
230. Id. at 65 (construing Farmer's Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,
272 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1954)). Originally the dissenting opinion, authorized by Jus-
tice Erickson, was to be the majority opinion. Following a rehearing, one of the
justices switched positions. Id. at 636.
231. Id. at 66 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
232. City of Florence v. Bd. of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148, 149 (Colo. 1990).
233. Id. It referenced the statutory provision of COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 37-80-120(3)
(West 2003). The downstream senior users are irrigators.
234. City of Florence, 793 P.2d at 149.
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water to be provided under an exchange agreement. 2 35 Thornton pro-
posed an out-of-priority diversion of high-quality water from a large
canal and replacement of the water with an equivalent quantity of
lower quality water from other sources. Shareholders in the canal as-
serted the need for specific provisions in the decree assuring adequate
quality water for their use. Under the agreement, water quality was
to be tested at the point at which substitute water would be added to
the canal. Specific parameters indicating the suitability of the water
for irrigation use were to be measured. The State Engineer was desig-
nated as responsible for ensuring compliance with these require-
ments. The court found these provisions sufficiently protective of
shareholder interests.236
A recent case considered objections by the City of Thornton to the
quality of effluent water discharged from the City of Denver's water
treatment plant and counted as replacement water under a plan for
augmentation. 23 7 The district (water) court had rejected Thornton's
request for a hearing to consider the sufficiency of the water quality.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. 2 38
The plan for augmentation allowed out-of-priority diversion of
water from the South Platte River to irrigate a golf course based on
replacement of diversions with unconsumed imported water dis-
charged from its water treatment plant. Thornton initially opposed
the plan, arguing the replacement water contained a variety of con-
stituents making it unsuitable for Thornton's use as a drinking water
supply. Under a negotiated settlement, Thornton then withdrew its
opposition, and the district court awarded Denver a decree for its
plan. 23 9 The decree included a seven-year period of retained jurisdic-
tion for consideration of actual injury that might arise to appropria-
tors.24 0 Thornton filed a petition for a hearing on water quality injury
prior to the expiration of the period of retained jurisdiction.241
The water court denied the petition, based on its view that dis-
charges from the treatment plant are subject to regulation by the state
Water Quality Control Commission and that its retained jurisdiction
authority did not extend to consideration of the sufficiency of these
regulations. The Colorado Supreme Court noted, however, the specific
statutory responsibility of the water court to protect both the quantity
and quality of replacement water provided under a plan for
augmentation:
235. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
236. Id. at 95-96.
237. In re Application for Planfor Augmentation of the City and County of Denver, 44
P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2002).
238. Id. at 1033.





If the substitute supply of water provided by Denver's Augmentation Plan
renders the water supply Thornton receives unsuitable for Thornton's normal
use of the water in comparison to the water it would otherwise receive at its
point of diversion if Denver's Augmentation Plan had not been instituted,
Thornton's property right in the use of its water is impaired by the substitute
supply. See Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d
116 (1951). Thus, prior to its approval of the augmentation plan, the water
court properly determined that senior appropriators would not be injured
based upon a prediction made at the decree's entry. § 37-92-305(5). Under
the retained jurisdiction provision of the augmentation plan decree in this
case, the authority to make the determination of injury to Thornton at the
time of the operational stage of the augmentation plan remains with the
water court notwithstanding the [Water Quality Control Act] and the [Water
Quality Control Commission's] general authority over water quality issues.
See § 25-8-104(1); 37-92-305(5).242
With this decision the Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed the protec-
tion given to the water quality requirements of existing appropria-
tions if replacement water is to be substituted for their use.
3. Implementation and Administration
One of the concerns associated with out-of-priority water uses is
the complexity and uncertainty that may be associated with their im-
plementation and the potential for imposing a burden on other water
users to protect their water rights. Indeed, both Oregon and Wyoming
include a test of implementability in evaluating proposed ex-
changes. 24 3 The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of un-
certainty in Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View
Meadows.244 Quoting from the opinion of the trial court, the Colorado
Supreme Court repeated:
Inherent in the hydrological and geological analysis upon which the plan for
augmentation herein is founded, is a degree of uncertainty, but the uncer-
tainty is no greater than that inherent in the administration of water rights
generally and is not of great significance. The assumptions upon which the
plan is based allow more than adequate latitude. If the plan for augmentation
is operated in accordance with the detailed conditions herein, it will have the
242. Id. at 1031-32. The Water Quality Control Act provides:
No provision of this article shall be interpreted so as to supersede, abro-
gate, or impair rights to divert water and apply water to beneficial uses
in accordance with the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of the
constitution of the state of Colorado, compacts entered into by the state
of Colorado, or the provisions of articles 80 to 93 of title 37, C.R.S., or
Colorado court determinations with respect to the determination and ad-
ministration of water rights. Nothing in this article shall be construed,
enforced, or applied so as to cause or result in material injury to water
rights.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-8-104(1) (West 2003). There had been some uncer-
tainty whether this provision precluded water court consideration of this water
quality issue.
243. See supra text accompanying note 196 and following note 200.
244. 550 P.2d 288 (1976).
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effect of replacing water in the stream at the times and places and in the
amounts of the depletions caused by the development's use of water.
2 4 5
By statute, plans for augmentation must include a provision for
retained jurisdiction to consider matters of injury.24 6 The period of
retained jurisdiction is to be determined by the judge and may be ex-
tended upon determination "that the nonoccurrence of injury shall not
have been conclusively determined." 24 7 In effect, there are two stages
to the injury analysis: the first based on predicting the future effects of
a plan for augmentation, and the second based on operational experi-
ence under the plan.248 In the words of the Colorado Supreme Court:
"Retained jurisdiction protects the rights of parties opposed to an aug-
mentation plan because it allows the water court to reconsider the
question of injury until the nonoccurrence of injury to the objecting
party's water rights is conclusively established.249
Virtually all states that statutorily provide for out-of-priority uses
in some form require review of the proposed means for enabling such a
use. While retained jurisdiction provides a mechanism for redressing
actual injury, once a plan for augmentation is in operation, it does not
relieve the burden on existing rights to protect themselves. Even
under retained jurisdiction the court has already made an initial de-
termination that the plan can operate without injury. Thus, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court has ruled that the party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction on the basis of injury must make a prima facie
showing of injury. 250 At that point, the burden of showing the absence
of injury shifts to the holder of the plan decree.
245. Id. at 296.
246. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-304(6) (West 2003).
247. Id.
248. In re Application for Plan for Augmentation of the City of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019,
1026 (Colo. 2002). The court explained: "Section 37-92-304(6) reflects the two
stages of the water court's future injury analysis. Farmers [Reservoir & Irriga-
tion] Co., 33 P.3d at 811 (Colo. 2001). The first stage is based on predicting the
future effects of an augmentation plan. Id. The second stage is based on [the]
operational experience of the augmentation plan."
249. In re City of Denver, 44 P.3d at 1026 (citation omitted). In City of Florence v.
Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990), objectors sought to include a
requirement for retained jurisdiction in exchange decrees. They pointed out only
a small fraction of the proposed exchanges was presently in operation so that it
was difficult to evaluate potential injury. The Colorado Supreme Court denied
this claim, finding the decree provisions adequately anticipated any future issues
and noting the exchange provisions of Colorado law, unlike those applying to
plans for augmentation, do not require a court to include a period of retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 152-53.
250. Id. See also Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33
P.3d 799, 811 (Colo. 2001) ("We have previously decided that the applicant for a
change of water right of plan for augmentation bears the initial burden of estab-
lishing the absence of injurious results from the proposed change or augmenta-
tion plan."); Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Colo. 1990)
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Proposals for out-of-priority water uses inevitably raise concerns
for existing appropriators. Requiring public review and approval is
the primary mechanism for ensuring such uses can occur without
harm to existing uses. Public supervision, including monitoring, also
is required. Those who would benefit from the new use generally are
expected to bear the associated costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Priority establishes a clear marker for allocating uses of water in
situations of limited supply. With knowledge of a water source's hy-
drology, priority helps make it possible to reasonably predict the
amount of water that will be available for use in any given year under
a water right. Seniority provides a higher degree of reliability that
the quantity of water appropriated will be available. In turn, this
higher degree of reliability encourages the investments necessary to
put water to work.
As a society we are interested in institutions and rules that facili-
tate the achievement of benefits. We have a strong interest in encour-
aging individuals to pursue and enjoy the benefits associated with
uses of water.25 1 A water right is an institutional mechanism for ena-
bling particular, water-dependent uses to be accomplished without in-
terference from other users. A water right is a means to an end-in
the vernacular of water law, a "beneficial use"-not an end in itself.
Particularly if ecological considerations are factored in, our water
resources are fully appropriated. Someone holds a legal claim to vir-
tually every drop of water in today's West. Yet, new needs for water
continue to arise. Rigidities in our water rights system and in our
attitudes about water impede the shift of water to meet new demands.
Slowly, surely, voluntary transfers of water and water rights are oc-
curring. Mechanisms to facilitate such transfers are developing that
help move us in the direction of more market-like means of meeting
water demands.
In addition, there are mechanisms described in this Article ena-
bling some realignment of water uses to better meet developing needs.
Instead of stepping into the priority of an existing right, these new
uses are recognized to be out-of-priority. They are accepted because
they can occur without diminishing others' ability to accomplish their
existing beneficial uses. They are non-traditional, they can be compli-
cated, and they sometimes require expensive monitoring and adminis-
("Finally, the water court did not err by requiring a party who invokes the court's
retained jurisdiction to make a prima facie showing of injury.").
251. At the same time we have a need as a society to sometimes establish such limita-
tions on individual actions as might be required for public purposes under police
power or other authority.
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tration, but they can help us meet today's changing water-based needs
without harming other uses. As problems with increasing develop-
ment of groundwater become more apparent,2 52 and as the costs of
developing additional quantities of surface water escalate, these
mechanisms become increasingly attractive.
252. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATER (2002).
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